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Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually 
focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms 
control behavior. Partly because the number of negotia-
ting parties i~ only two, there is a propensity to focus 
on the bilateral relationship of the United States and 
the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political 
situations. Only superficial attention has usually been 
2 
given to international systems variables that may well 
influence the domestic political situation and arms con-
trol policy. 
This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of 
US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political en-
vironment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that 
includes the West European members of NATO as a single 
actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union) 
is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior. 
Three main reasons are given as to why this parti-
cular subsystem is an important determinant in US/Soviet 
arms control. First, arms control is a security issue. 
It involves both defense and deterrence. 
Secondly, each actor in the subsystem plays an im-
portant security role, either as adversary or alliance 
partner, or both. Certain assumptions of behavior are 
accordingly ascribed to each actor. Alliance unity and 
alliance reassurance then become part of the overall 
security equation. 
Third, Western Europe has played an increasingly 
influential role in US/Soviet arms control due to its 
geo-strategic position between the two superpowers, its 
growing economic position in the international arena, and 
the attainment of nuclear parity between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Greater attention is now given to 
two additional factorsa West European security concerns 
of "entrapment" in a nuclear war as a result of superpower 
J 
conflicta and, U.S. •abandonment• of its military commit-
ment to protect Western Europe as a result of superpower 
cooperation. 
The chapters of this thesis present an inquiry into 
certain domestic determinants of US/Soviet arms control 
behavior in three arms control regimes (SALT I, SALT II, 
and INF/START), followed by observations that support and 
emphasize the explanatory influence of the subsystem per-
spective. 
Utilizing •events-data• analysis and the New York 
Times Index, quantitative data is presented as additional 
support for the subsystem perspective. 
For each arms control regime analyzed, it is con-
cluded that US/Soviet arms control is influenced by the 
interaction of the adversary/alliance subsystem relation-
ships. The resultant political environment of this 
subsystem affects US/Soviet arms control, and influences 
the domestic determinants of arms control as well. In 
part, SALT I negotiations were motivated by Western 
security perceptions, particularly among West Europeans, 
that sought an end to the Cold War relations by promoting 
East/West cooperation. The results were the treaties of 
SALT I and the codification of detente. By the latter 
1970s, however, NATO perceptions of security had changed, 
focusing on the need for new weapons deployments in lieu 
of arms control. SALT II was doomed, in part by criticism 
at home and in Western Europe, that it failed to address 
the perceived imbalance in theater nuclear forces. 
The INF/START negotiations in the early 1980s 
reflected another change in NATO security perceptions. 
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This time cruise and Pershing II missiles would be de-
ployed in Western Europe but would be coupled with arms 
control negotiations. The •dual track" decision was not 
so much a bargaining chip tactic to achieve reductions in 
Soviet missiles as it was a demonstration of NATO ambiva-
lence over Western security policy. The •dual track• 
decision was designed both to reduce West European concer~s 
of entrapment, via arms control, and to reduce West Euro-
pean fears of abandonment via arms deployments. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW OF GOALS 
The basic purpose of this study's examination of 
US/Soviet arms control is to broaden the analytic scope of 
this issue.1 Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have 
usually focused either on the domestic political situation 
of the United States or the Soviet Union, or have emphasized 
comparisons of their domestic policies in explaining arms 
control behavior. The wide range of literature on this 
issue has generally given only perfunctory attention to 
international system variables that may well influence the 
domestic political situation and arms control policy. 2 
The perfunctory attention given to international 
system variables in analyses of US/Soviet arms control is 
partly because of an assumption based in the bilateral 
nature of formal negotiations. Since the number of 
negotiating parties is limited to two, there is a propensity 
to focus solely on the foreign policymaking of those two 
parties. Such approaches are highly applicable, yet they 
are not without limitations.3 The actions of one state that 
affect its relations with another state are not made in 
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total isolation from the rest of the international system. 
Therefore, it is quite possible to enhance our understanding 
of certain foreign policy behavior by including relevant 
international system variables. 4 In order to demonstrate 
the importance of including relevant international system 
variables in US/Soviet arms control analyses, three arms 
control regimes have been chosen for examination. They are 
SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), SALT II, and 
INF/START (Intermediate Nuclear Forces and Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks). 
THE SUBSYSTEM MODEL 
Citing international system variables that may 
influence US/Soviet arms control is not a difficult task 
given the highly interactive nature of world politics. 
However, because arms control is a security issue,~ it is 
essential that the criteria in choosing relevant 
international system variables for examination are those 
which have the most direct influence on U.S. and Soviet 
security, and those that are most directly affected by 
US/Soviet arms control. The variables chosen for this study 
are the US/Soviet relationship, the US/West European 
relationship, and the West European/Soviet relationship. 6 
These three dyads form a trilateral subsystem7 in 
which Western Europe, 8 though not a direct party to the 
US/Soviet arms control treaties or negotiations chosen for 
examination, does have a significant influence on arms 
control behavior by virtue of its position as alliance 
partner with the United States, its gee-strategic position 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, its growing 
economic influence in the world, and the attainment of 
nuclear parity between the two superpowers (see Figure 1). 
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Following World War II the security of Europe was 
linked to the security of the United States by extending the 
U.S. nuclear deterrent to its West European allies. At that 
time U.S. hegemony over the alliance was an accepted fact as 
was the credibility of the United States to deter Soviet 
aggression against Western Europe. "Massive Retaliation" 
was a credible policy of deterrence as long as the United 
States could strike the Soviet Union without risking a 
reciprocal strike. The "decoupling" effect9 of nuclear 
parity was not a foreseeable problem in the earlier years of 
the alliance, but fostered by the post-war economic recovery 
of Western Europe and intensified by the attainment of 
strategic parity between the superpowers, the security 
concerns unique to West Europeans have been expressed with 
an increasingly more independent and confident voice. 
Accordingly, these concerns are translated into 
political leverage over the arms control positions of the 
two superpowers. With both the United States and the Soviet 
Union seeking to accommodate the West Europeans, the junior 
alliance partner thus acquires indirect, though highly 
NOINil 
.!aIAOS > 
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influential bargaining power in arms negotiations. It is 
the changes in West European security concerns and the 
effects of those changes on the subsystem relationships that 
are important in explaining the success or failure of 
US/Soviet arms control. 
ASSUMPTIONS OF BEHAVIOR 
The role of each actor within the subsystem allows 
certain assumptions to be made regarding their behavior 
toward one another. 
The US/Soviet relationship, characterized as 
adversarial, is such that each perceives the other as the 
main threat to its own security. As security enhancing 
measures each attempts to undermine the security of the 
other and maintain a credible deterrence against the 
encroachment of its own security. The unity of NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) is perceived by the United 
States as essential to its deterrence of the Soviet Union. 10 
The Soviet Union perceives alliance unity as a threat to its 
own security. Therefore, Soviet arms control policy will 
attempt to divide the alliance whereas U.S. arms control 
policy will attempt to unify it. 
The US/West European relationship is characterized by 
partnership in military alliance (NATO). The alliance is 
characterized by common security but it is also 
characterized by distinct security concerns. It is these 
individual concerns about security that can cause tensions 
between the alliance partners. 
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Similar to the "abandonment-entrapment dilemma" 
discussed by Robert Osgood, alliance tensions can be caused 
by adversary cooperation or by adversary conflict. 11 West 
European concerns may be heightened if U.S. bilateral 
agreements with the Soviet Union are perceived as evidence 
of American abandonment of Western Europe. On the other 
hand, concerns may rise if US/Soviet conflict (i.e., nuclear 
arms race) is perceived as leading to entrapment in a 
superpower inflicted war. Thus, Western Europe may 
encourage a US/Soviet rapprochement in order to reduce the 
risks of entrapment, but may then criticize the United 
States and/or the Soviet Union if the trend of adversary 
cooperation begins to show signs of abandonment. 
As Jane Sharp has suggested, this relationship should 
be viewed as circular rather than linear, as a cycle which 
may begin by Western Europe seeking reassurance from the 
United States due to anxiety causing events. 1 2 The United 
States then responds with reassurance in the form of 
consultations, new weapons for NATO defense, or a tougher 
policy toward arms control. The West Europeans then 
encourage a renewed superpower attempt at cooperation, 
which, if further bilateral agreements are generated, may 
induce new fears of abandonment.1 3 
The West European/Soviet relationship includes the 
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abandonment-entrapment concerns of Western Europe and the 
adversarial characteristic of that relationship. The Soviet 
Union, through policies of cooperation or conflict toward 
Western Europe, may attempt to divide the alliance. Western 
Europe may promote cooperation or conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union depending upon its own 
security concerns. Western Europe may also choose policies 
of cooperation or conflict with the Soviet Union depending 
upon its perceptions of U.S. abandonment and/or superpower 
entrapment. 
The arms control policies of the United States and the 
Soviet Union are, therefore, affected by the trilateral 
relationships of the subsystem. By examining these 
relationships and US/Soviet arms control over specific time 
periods, it should be possible to suggest in which instances 
the subsystem variables had more influence on arms 
negotiations than the domestic perspective. 
There are questions that might be raised to compare 
the domestic and subsystem approaches. For example, should 
the motivation by the United States and the Soviet Union to 
pursue SALT I be regarded more as policy goals 
characteristic of the Nixon administration and the Brezhnev 
regime, or should the stimulus to negotiate be viewed more 
as a result of systemic pressures on the United States and 
the Soviet Union? Were the failure of the U.S. Senate to 
ratify the SALT II Treaty and the NATO decision to deploy 
8 
cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe primarily 
due to political features of the Carter administration 
and/or Soviet policies, or were they consequences of a 
larger political environment in which Western Europe had 
become more openly disconcerted over a US/Soviet condominium 
that sacrificed West European security? Was the collapse of 
the INF/START talks in 1983 due to Andropov's waning 
political power, Soviet domestic problems, and the anti-
Soviet ideology of the Reagan administration, or in the 
systemic view, was the Soviet walkout part of a consistency 
in Soviet policy--the use of arms control to drive a 
political wedge between the United States and Western 
Europe? 
There are, of course, no black and white answers. 
This is true in part because the explanations are colored by 
the characteristics of both perspectives. This study is not 
predisposed toward any single-dimension approach to the 
study of arms control, but it is critical of comparative 
research that excludes international system variables as 
explanatory possibilities. 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DATA 
The time frame covered in this study is from 1969 
through 1983. This period coincides with events surrounding 
three arms control regimes--SALT I, SALT II, and INF/START. 
Each of the three subsystem relationships is observed over 
each period of arms control so that conclusions can be made 
regarding the association between these variables and arms 
control behavior. 
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Measurement of each variable is accomplished by the 
use of "events-data" analysis. 14 The relevance of this 
method is that it utilizes behavior as the unit of 
observation. Events are transformed into data according to 
the type of behavior they represent. 1 ~ Each variable is 
characterized by its behavior classification, derived from a 
set of events observed over a specific time period. Because 
the chronology of events is retained in the analysis of the 
data, and because the data are classified by type and 
frequency, this methodology also allows for the use of some 
quantitative analytic procedures. 
Data has been collected for each subsystem 
relationship, then coded according to its behavior type. 
For both the US/Soviet and the West European/Soviet 
relationships, behavior is classified into a 
conflict/cooperation typology. Events are coded according 
to the degree of cooperation or conflict they reflect. The 
US/West European relationship is coded somewhat differently. 
A unity/disunity typology is used and events are coded by 
the degree to which they reflect unity or disunity in the 
alliance relationship. 
Following the collection and coding of data for each 
variable, simple quantitative analytic techniques have been 
10 
employed. These techniques organize the data into frequency 
and percentage tables for general and more specific time 
periods of arms control (see Appendix). These tables show 
both the frequencies of behavior across time and the 
distribution of behavior classifications across time for 
each subsystem variable. The percent positive for each 
relationship has been graphically illustrated (see Figure 
2). Conclusions can then be based on the observed 
association between arms control behavior and the subsystem 
variables, both in the aggregate and for more specific time 
periods. 
In addition to the subsystem approach, an internal 
variable has been observed for the same time period. 
Labeled the Political Leader Characteristics Variable, it 
measures certain aspects of the domestic political situation 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union which have 
been deemed relevant in influencing arms control. This 
variable capsulizes Margaret Hermann's model, the 
''Leadership Characteristics Variable," into three 
categories: "Personal Attitudes"; "Scope of Authority''; and 
"Participation." 16 These categories represent 
characteristics of the political leader, not just those he 
personally provides (e.g., ideology) but also those created 
by his political position as head of a particular political 
system. 
''Personal Attitudes" refers to the leader's unique 
100 
90 
80 
/ '\ --v ........... /: ~ ,/ ~~ 
II \ 
/ 
\ \, ~ -' ...... c J -.~ ~ 
~ I/ ' v '\ ?\ ""' ~ ~ J ~ ~ ........ ~ 
\I f .... ,.... ~ / '\....c 
\ ...... v" v 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
:s 
Yr 69 70 71 72 74 75 76 77 78 79 81 82 83 
73 80 
SRLT I SALT JI INF I STRRT 
V. Eur. /Sov. o 
USIV Eur. • 
US/SOY • 
Figure 2. Graph showing percent positive in sub-
system relationships. 
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political style, his personal beliefs, and personal views of 
the world. 
"Scope of Authority" refers to the political leader's 
latitude in decisionmaking. Does he have the support of 
Congress? Of the public? How constrained is he in his 
immediate decisionmaking role? In the case of the American 
leader, this is measured by the margin by which he was 
elected, by public approval in reliable surveys, and by the 
percent of his party's constituency represented in Congress. 
In the case of the Soviet leader, scope of authority is 
measured by the degree to which he dominates decisionmaking 
in the Politburo, and the relative ease with which his 
policy goals are implemented and carried out. 
"Participation" refers to the amount of attention the 
leader gives personally to foreign policy, particularly arms 
control. This not only involves his personal interest in 
arms control but also the degree to which he delegates his 
authority to his subordinates or relies on others in his 
decisionrnaking. 
Although this variable does not encompass other 
domestic political factors, it does cover the most relevant 
and accessible in regards to arms control policymaking. 
13 
CHAPTER I NOTES 
tFor analytical purposes of this study arms control is 
defined as: arrangements between the United States and the 
Soviet Union to limit and/or reduce their nuclear force 
structures. Both states' behavior towards arms control 
include: the motivation of either side to pursue arms 
control agreements; their negotiating positions; proposals 
and rejections of proposals, and; reasons for agreements or 
failure to reach agreements. 
2A few recent examples include, Thomas W. Wolfe, The 
SALT Experience (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., Inc., 
1979); Frank Whelen Wayman, "Arms Control and Strategic Arms 
Voting in the U.S. Senate," Journal of Conflict Resolution 
(Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1985); Myron Hedlin, "Moscow's Line on 
Arms Control," Problems of Communism (May/June 1984); and 
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1984) . 
3For an excellent discussion of the advantages and 
limitations of various comparative foreign policy approaches 
see, Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. 
Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1978). 
4 For an excellent analysis of international system 
variable influence on foreign policy see, Gary L. Scott and 
Takashi Shinobu, "Reassessing the Japan-China Peace and 
Friendship Treaty Negotiations: A Comparative Foreign Policy 
Perspective," gournal of Northeast Asian Studies (Vol II, 
No. 4, December 1983). 
~The term security is a highly ambiguous and thus 
controversial concept. For purposes of this study, security 
refers to the military defense of a state or the ability tc 
deter an adversary. The necessary security requirement of ~ 
state and the perceptions of threats to that security are 
determined by the political leaders of that state. 
6 0ther international system variables that may 
influence US/Soviet arms control such as Japan, China, and 
the Warsaw Pact do not fit the criteria as neatly as Western 
Europe. Japan, although a major economic power and included 
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not a military alliance 
partner with either the United States or the Soviet Union. 
The Warsaw Pact, an alliance of East Bloc countries, may 
influence US/Soviet arms control. However, independence in 
foreign policymaking is far more subordinate to Soviet 
policy than West European policymaking is to United States 
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policy. Additionally, information regarding policy process 
is highly inaccessible. 
However, other analyses of US/Soviet arms control 
which include these or other international system variables 
are encouraged since they further a broader understanding of 
US/Soviet arms control and the development of multicausal 
theory. 
7 A subsystems approach adheres to the same theoretical 
views of a systems approach, although it delineates a 
particular subset of the international system for 
examination. For further discussion and references of the 
systemic perspective in international relations theory see, 
for example, Maurice A. East, "The International System 
Perspective and Foreign Policy," in East, et al., Why 
Nations Act, pp. 143-160; "Systemic Theories of Politics and 
International Relations," in James E. Dougherty and Robert 
L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International 
Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), and; Richard 
Little, "A Systems Approach," in Trevor Taylor, ed., 
Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London: 
Longman Group Limited, 1978), pp. 182-204. 
8 Another aspect of the subsystem model must be 
clarified. This is the theoretical treatment of Western 
Europe as a single political actor. While this may present 
real problems in practice, it is most appropriate to the 
approach of this study. The level of analysis from which 
arms control is examined utilizes Western Europe as a single 
unit, as an alliance partner, and thereby posits a distinct 
set of theoretical questions. 
9 The verb ''decouple" is a term applied in alliance and 
deterrence theory. In the context of NATO and the extended 
deterrent of the United States to Western Europe, the 
decoupling effect refers to the splitting up of alliance 
partners due to the lack of credibility of extended 
deterrence in a political environment characterized by 
strategic parity between the superpowers. 
1 °For a thoughtful discussion on this point see, for 
example, Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: 
Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 61, 
1983) 1 PP• 309-324. 
11 See, Robert E. Osgood, The Entangling Alliance 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). For further 
discussion see, for example, Glen H. Snyder, "The Security 
dilemma in alliance Politics," World Politics (No. 36, July 
1984). 
15 
12 See, Jane M.O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance 
Commitments," Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 100, No. 4, 
Winter 1985-1986). 
t3Ibid., pp. 651-652. 
14 For a discussion of the techniques of events-data 
analysis see, for example, Charles A. McClelland, et al., 
The Communist Chinese Performance in Crisis and Noncrisis: 
Quantitative Studies of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation, 
1950-1964 (U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, 
Ca., 1967); and Charles A. McClelland and Gary Hoggard, 
"Conflict Patterns in the Interaction Among Nations," in 
James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969). This study follows 
McClelland's method, although a variation in the coding of 
events has been adapted to meet the peculiarities of this 
study. This analysis utilizes the New York Times Index as 
its source. I must note that by relying on a single source 
for my data I risk some degree of validity. This I have 
opted to do in the interest of time and simplicity. 
1 ~The definition of an "event" is borrowed from the 
CREON Project (Comparative Research on the Events of 
Nations). Unpublished Manuscript, p. 34. " ... a 
minimally aggregated action resulting from a decision by the 
political authorities of a state, who have the power to 
commit the resources of the national government." An event 
consists of an actor, an action, and the direct object or 
indirect object of that action. 
16 The characteristics of this variable are taken 
mainly from the leader personality perspective discussed by 
Margaret Hermann in "Effects of Personal Characteristics of 
Political Leaders on Foreign Policy," in East, et al., Why 
Nations Act, pp. 49-68. 
CHAPTER II 
SALT I 
THE ISSUES OF SALT I 
The issues and events associated with the negotiation 
of SALT I begin with the opening meeting between the U.S. 
and Soviet delegations in Helsinki in November 1969 and end 
with the signing of the SALT agreements in Moscow on 26 May 
1972. This period covers the seven rounds of talks between 
the two delegations, alternating between Helsinki and 
Vienna; the so-called "back channel" negotiations between 
higher officials of both governments; and the climactic 
summit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary 
Brezhnev, during which the final details of the agreements 
were worked out. The following is a summary of the key 
issues of SALT I. 1 
Aside from the agreements signed in 1971, to reduce 
the accidental occurrence of nuclear war and to upgrade the 
communications link between the two countries, SALT I 
produced two separate agreements on the limitation of 
strategic weapons systems. These were the ABM Treaty, a 
limitation on Antiballistic Missile systems, and the Interim 
Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons. The latter 
agreement, however, was limited to missile launchers. 
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Although these agreements marked a real achievement in 
the progress toward mutual arms reduction, they demonstrated 
only moderate results from what began as much broader 
objectives; from the total banning of ABMs to a 
comprehensive limitation and reduction of both offensive and 
defensive systems, including Forward-Based Systems (FBS), 
and Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). 
The first round of talks in Helsinki was considered an 
exploratory meeting, open to discussion on any related 
issue. The Soviets immediately took the opportunity to 
raise the question of American FBS, those weapons systems 
deployed in forward bases around Western Europe. 2 
This issue opened the way for debate over the definition of 
tactical versus strategic weapons, a debate that became a 
major obstacle to any comprehensive treaty limiting 
offensive weapons. The Soviets opposed any freeze on their 
European targeted Intermediate and Medium-range Ballistic 
Missiles (IR/MRBMs), labeling them tactical (incapable of 
striking the U.S. mainland), but insisted on including in a 
treaty the "strategic" Forward-Based Systems of the United 
States (capable of striking the Soviet Union) . On the other 
hand, the United States defined its FBS not by whom or what 
they were targeted at, but by their range capability. Thus, 
18 
only American systems capable of intercontinental range were 
deemed strategic. 
It was not until late in the second round of talks in 
Vienna (August 1970) that the first real proposals toward a 
treaty were offered by either side. The U.S. proposal 
became known as the "Vienna Option.'' This proposal, 
actually a modification of three slightly different 
approaches, limited launchers of both sides, put a 
subceiling on Soviet SS-9 launchers, and established a 
freeze at current levels on strategic bombers, IR/MRBMs, and 
Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs). References to 
MIRVs included either total banning of flight testing and 
deployment, or no limitation coupled with incremental 
reductions in launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs). ABMs would either be limited to one site for each 
country to defend its National Command Authority (NCA), or 
they would be completely banned. Any treaty would be 
comprehensive, considering offensive and defensive systems 
together. A Soviet proposal called for joint retaliation 
against any country launching a provocative attack against 
either party. Neither proposal was well received. 
The third round of talks in Helsinki was relatively 
passive in that the United States held to the Vienna Option, 
insisting that the Soviets respond to it. The Soviets 
continued their arguments to include FBS. In December 1970 
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the Soviets tabled their FBS "Compensation Proposal'' which 
was, according to them, an attempt to compromise on the FBS 
issue. 3 This meant a partial rather than complete 
withdrawal of U.S. Forward-Based Systems, but to be 
accompanied by a reduction in U.S. strategic launchers--the 
launcher reduction being compensation for any remaining FBS. 
Rejecting this proposal, the United States then offered the 
so-called ''Helsinki Formula" by which the United States 
would consider the FBS issue only after all the main 
elements of an initial agreement on central strategic 
systems had been worked out. 4 The Soviets, however, were 
not interested. 
Near the end of this round a private proposal was made 
by the head of the Soviet delegation for a mutual no first 
use of nuclear weapons. This, too, was unacceptable for the 
United States. Also in December the Soviets directed the 
negotiations away from a comprehensive agreement by 
proposing their "Basic Provisions for an Agreement on 
Limiting Deployment of ABM Systems." This called for a 
singling out of the ABM issue and negotiating a separate 
agreement. The "Provisions" included one ABM site to defend 
launchers, missiles and radars; a limitation on the radius 
of defense around each capital, and; equal numbers of 
launchers and missiles. Retreating somewhat from its 
position in favor of a comprehensive offensive/defensive 
treaty, the United States did not reject the proposal 
outright but left it open for further discussion. 
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The fourth round of talks began in March 1971. While 
the delegations made little progress in Vienna, the focus of 
the negotiations had transferred to "backchannel" meetings. 
Talks between National Security Advisor Kissinger and Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin led to an exchange of letters between 
President Nixon and Soviet Premier Kosygin. This became 
known as the May 1971 Accord. It also marked a turning 
point in the U.S. position. By ''agreeing to agree" to focus 
on ABM limitations the United States was abandoning its 
comprehensive treaty position in favor of negotiating a 
defensive treaty separate from an offensive one. Both sides 
also narrowed their objective for a moratorium or freeze 
approach to offensive weapons. But the United States had 
not excluded offensive freeze limitations altogether. 
Rather, it insisted on a freeze in conjunction with an ABM 
agreement. The Soviets, however, refused to negotiate a 
freeze until an ABM treaty was reached. Both the fourth 
round of talks and the following round in Helsinki 
subsequently focused on negotiating an ABM treaty. 
Progress was made on ABM issues, while offensive 
freeze negotiations remained stalled. The fifth round, from 
July to September 1971, produced the first real results of 
SALT--the Joint Draft Text of an ABM Agreement. Then on 
October 12 President Nixon announced his decision to go to 
Moscow the following spring. This set a deadline of sorts 
and quickened the pace for progress in negotiations, which 
resumed for a sixth round in November. 
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In Vienna talks continued on unagreed items of the ABM 
treaty while discussions on an offensive freeze were 
revived. Still opposing the inclusion of SLBMs, the Soviets 
tabled a freeze proposal halting new ICBM development and 
deployment beginning 1 July 1972, or at such time the treaty 
would take effect. A freeze on new ICBM launchers following 
the signing of the treaty was acceptable to the United 
States, but only on conditions which allowed some 
modernization and replacement of outdated systems. 
By March 1972, as the seventh round of talks proceeded 
in Helsinki, an agreement on ABMs was nearing its final 
stages. Talks on an interim freeze on offensive weapons 
were also progressing. The remaining issues of the ABM 
treaty were narrowed to numbers, how many sites and where, 
how many launchers and interceptor missiles, and how many 
radar components. Negotiations on the interim freeze 
continued over the SLBM debate, a ceiling on "heavy" 
launchers, and the duration that the treaty would remain in 
force. 
Toward mid-April Kissinger began meeting secretly with 
Brezhnev to discuss SALT and arrangements for Nixon's 
impending visit scheduled for May. Kissinger returned from 
Moscow with a Soviet proposal on the SLBM and ABM issues in 
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which Brezhnev indicated a willingness to include SLBMs at 
specified levels. The pace of compromise increased steadily 
as the summit date approached. By the time the President's 
negotiating team arrived in Moscow the only ABM item left to 
agree to was the distance between the permitted ABM sites--a 
concern over radar overlap. A freeze on new ICBM launchers 
had already been agreed upon in Helsinki, and the levels of 
submarines and launchers resolved by Kissinger and Brezhnev. 
All of the unfinished negotiating points were worked 
out in Moscow prior to the final signing of the treaties. 
One of the few remaining issues involved modernization and 
replacement, made somewhat difficult due to the problems of 
verification. Agreement was reached, however, on both 
issues; modernization and replacement being limited only by 
the provisions of the treaties themselves, and treaty 
compliance to be carried out by national means. 
While the above summary of SALT I does not capture the 
complexity of the negotiations (i.e., technical details of 
the weaponry, or negotiating tactics) it does, however, 
highlight the key issues involved. Attempting to provide 
explanatory meaning to these issues is yet another matter. 
What were the motives behind those positions and proposals 
taken by both sides? 
Why, for instance, was SALT able to begin in 1969 but 
not in 1968? Why were the negotiations policy goals of the 
United States and the Soviet Union? Why were the 
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negotiations able to overcome serious obstacles? Why were 
the treaties signed in 1972? Why was the Soviet Union so 
adamant about including U.S. Forward-Based Systems? Why did 
the U.S. abandon its position for a comprehensive treaty? 
Many of these questions can surely be answered with 
reasonable reliability as products of certain political 
factors at work within the two countries. Others, however, 
can only be answered, or given more meaning, from the 
subsystem perspective. 
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE 
The Nixon Administration: Personal Attitudes 
The unique personal qualities which Richard Nixon 
brought to the White House, together with the extraordinary 
circumstances in which he left, has presented itself as an 
intriguing case study to many observers; political 
scientists, historians, and psychoanalysts alike. 
What emerges from the literature is a general 
consensus of Nixon; that he was pragmatic, conservative, 
insecure, paranoid, secretive, and self-aggrandizing. 
Barber classifies Nixon as an "active-negative'' president.~ 
According to this analysis, Nixon's aggressiveness, his 
compulsive striving for power and status, and his 
inflexibility were contrasted by a destructive tendency, a 
weak ego, insecurity, and low self-esteem. The coexistence 
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of these qualities eventually led to his downfall. He was 
his own worst enemy. 
Mazlish, in his psychohistorical analysis of Nixon, 
emphasizes three overriding personality traits: his "almost 
unique absorption of self" in his role as President; his 
"ambivalence"; and, his "denial" in accepting his own 
aggressive nature. 6 Nixon saw himself as a man of 
"greatness," but was paranoid in his fear of criticism, 
passivity, and dependence on others. 7 
According to Kissinger, who was closest to Nixon 
during his presidency, Nixon "feared rebuffs," was paranoid, 
and distrusted almost everyone, including members of his own 
cabinet. 8 Aside from a few observers who view Nixon's 
policies as reflecting his true liberal character, his 
prepresidential "hawkish" views as nothing more than vote-
seeking rhetoric, 9 the more general feeling is one of a 
conservative Nixon whose anti-communist ideology and 
campaign rhetoric were dominated by his pragmatism in 
foreign policy once he took office. 
Nixon came to off ice a strong backer of 
"superiority." As a candidate he had charged the 
Johnson administration with permitting a "security 
gap." He had called "parity" a "peculiar, 
unprecedented doctrine," and he said that "it 
appears that the closer we approach strategic 
parity, the further we move from a stable peace." 
He hoped, he had said, to be able to negotiate with 
the Russians, "from a superior standpoint." 10 
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Participation 
After taking office in January 1969, Nixon indicated 
that his administration would base its Soviet policy not on 
confrontation but "negotiation," not on military superiority 
but military "sufficiency." 11 This policy goal not only 
reflected his pragmatism (which was influenced by 
Kissinger's "Realpolitik'') but also demonstrated an 
intention that he, as President, would play the principal 
role in foreign policy decisionmaking. 
Nixon's high level of participation in foreign policy 
decisionmaking was based partly on his personal desire for 
status and his distrust of others. But it was also based on 
a genuine interest and experience in foreign affairs. As 
Vice President under Eisenhower, Nixon traveled extensively, 
meeting with a number of foreign leaders. He also displayed 
a great intuitive ability for international politics. 
Kissinger "was struck by his perceptiveness and knowledge" 
on foreign policy.12 
Scope of Authority 
Nixon lacked a wide scope of authority and bipartisan 
support for his policy goals. In fact, Nixon's election 
victory over Humphrey was by a narrow margin in popular 
vote; 42.7 percent for Humphrey, and 43.4 percent for 
Nixon. 13 If the ability to carry out policy goals is judged 
by his party's voting strength in Congress, then Nixon 
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clearly needed bipartisan support. In both the House and 
the Senate the Republican Party remained the minority party 
throughout Nixon's entire presidency. 1 4 
Election Year Politics 
Nixon's October 1971 announcement of his intention to 
visit Moscow by May 1972 not only created a deadline for 
SALT (partly due to the expectations usually reserved for 
summit meetings), but also prepared the way for the 1972 
presidential elections. Success in SALT would be a big plus 
for Nixon come November. 
Nixon would be just as anxious to show positive 
results to Congress, lest it begin to withdraw its support 
for new weapons programs. Nixon was concerned about losing 
his bargaining-chip leverage with the Soviets, due to 
opposition with Congress. The Senate had given its support 
for the Safeguard ABM program by a margin of only one 
vote. 1 ~ This was a clear statement to the President that 
Congress did not share his regard for bargaining-chip 
diplomacy as the best way to achieve arms control, or 
detente. 
Nixon's announcement of the Moscow summit was 
conveniently timed in order to gain a much needed boost in 
his pre-election popularity ratings. Although his 
popularity among the American public was on average higher 
than that of most of his predecessors, 1971 became the low 
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point of his term. Following the 1972 summit, however, his 
approval rating jumped to about 60 percent (see Figure 3). 
While Nixon had to deal with the constraint of a 
Democratic majority in Congress throughout his entire term, 
his re-election was also challenged by the fact that by 
January 1972 the Republican Party in Congress was 
outnumbered by Democrats by the widest margin in several 
years. 16 Since Nixon's re-election rested on attracting a 
large segment of cross-party voters there was a heightened 
concern to demonstrate success as the "peace candidate." 
Next to seeking a resolution to the Vietnam conflict, the 
achievement of a SALT treaty offered a most convenient 
strategy to secure that image. 
Nixon and SALT I 
Many of Nixon's characteristics are evidenced in U.S. 
arms control behavior during the SALT negotiations. 
Technological advances in nuclear weapons systems (ABMs, 
MIRVs, new strategic bombers) threatened to disrupt the 
relative stability in the military balance of the 
superpowers in the late 1960s. As the Soviets continued to 
build their strategic forces to a level of parity with the 
United States, Nixon saw arms control as the best way to 
ensure a stable relationship. Arms control, however, was 
not seen as an end in itself. Nixon's style of diplomacy, 
"linkage,'' was to be applied to Soviet behavior, not only 
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in other regions of the world, but to strategic goals, with 
arms control concessions as incentives. 
Another aspect of his negotiating style, similar to 
linkage, was his advocacy of ''bargaining-chip" diplomacy~ 
promoting research, development, and deployment of new 
weapons systems in order to gain concessions from the Soviet 
Union. 
Explicit in Nixon's style is the fact that he did not 
abandon his advocacy of superiority over the Soviet Union. 
Although it was couched in more conciliatory terminology, 
Nixon's own interpretation of parity and sufficiency meant 
that U.S. forces must not be inferior, and that there be no 
Soviet advantages with which to politically exploit the 
United States. 17 Basically, these ideas amounted to a 
realistic acceptance of parity as long as the United States 
retained the military and political edge in deterrence. 
This edge, as Nixon saw it, was being given away willingly 
in President Johnson's SALT policy. 
It was because of clear evidence of a growing Soviet 
capability in 1969 that, he says, he decided in March 1969 
to develop Safeguard, an ABM system better equipped to 
defend U.S. ICBMs. 18 The opening of SALT was then delayed 
until November in order to buy more time to elicit 
Congressional support for a new weapons program at a time 
when the defense budget was facing increasing cuts. 
While the Safeguard program was primarily to be used 
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as a bargaining chip in SALT, it was also essential to the 
U.S. position favoring a comprehensive offensive/defensive 
treaty. By strengthening the U.S. position on ABM, which 
the Soviets wanted to see stopped, Nixon planned to link 
defense concessions to limitations and/or reductions in 
Soviet offensive systems. 
It was not only Nixon's pragmatism and style, however, 
that guided U.S. behavior in SALT. His paranoia and drive 
for personal power led him to rely increasingly on a few key 
people in policymaking--chiefly Kissinger. Nixon loathed 
the idea of allowing the bureaucracy its role in the 
decisionmaking process. He distrusted them, especially the 
State Department and the Foreign Service. According to 
Kissinger, "Nixon considered (Secretary of State) Rogers' 
unfamiliarity with the subject (foreign policy) an asset 
because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in 
the White House."19 
As negotiations continued, Nixon came to rely on 
Kissinger to such an extent that he began dealing 
with key foreign leaders through channels that 
directly linked the White House Situation Room to 
the field without going through the State 
Department--the so-called backchannels . . . Nixon 
increasingly moved sensitive negotiations into the 
White House where he could supervise them directly, 
get the credit personally, and avoid the 
bureaucratic disputes or inertia that he found so 
distastefu1.20 
While Nixon has been criticized for attempting to 
expand the power of the President, for ignoring the 
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bureaucracy and Congress, and for sidestepping the U.S. SALT 
delegation, at times leaving them totally in the dark as to 
U.S. negotiating positions, 21 it is probable that the 
backchannel negotiations prevented a much longer, drawn out 
SALT or even an eventual impasse had negotiations continued 
in their original manner. The Soviets were not budging at 
all from their "ABM only" proposal, and a growth in Soviet 
offensive systems was reported to be steadily rising. It 
could also be argued that the Soviets pref erred the use of a 
more direct and unpublicized negotiating approach. Thus, 
the backchannel would have offered a more conducive 
atmosphere for serious negotiations. 
Analyzing Soviet Politics 
A tendency in many analyses of the decisionmaking 
process and leadership characteristics in Soviet politics 
has been to employ analytic variations of comparative 
bureaucratic approaches and "interest group" approaches; 22 
and "power consolidation" approaches. 23 Often times, 
studies that focus on comparative bureaucratic and interest 
group approaches in Soviet politics have relied too much on 
comparisons with the American political system. Whereas all 
bureaucratic institutions may be said to exhibit some 
similar qualities (i.e., employee identification with his or 
her organization, and inter-departmental "bargaining" and 
"coalition building") , 2 4 the degree of direct participation 
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in actual policymaking is not so easily analogized. 
However, because of the unique "centralist" features of 
Soviet politics (a traditionally ''rubber stamp" role of the 
legislative bodies and a somewhat more collective but 
independent authority vested in the executive) , 20 greater 
attention to the role of the principal bureaucratic 
institutions and their influences within the Politburo seems 
in order. 
The "power consolidation" approaches, on the other 
hand, focus on strengthening political position through 
coalition building and interest group support, patron-client 
relationships, and purges of organization membership. 
The Brezhnev Regime 
The general attitude toward Leonid Brezhnev's 
leadership characteristics is based on some combination of 
the above approaches plus his personal characteristics: an 
overall conservative approach, in personal outlook, and 
toward political reform; an ability to manage competitive 
interests within the system, and; whenever possible, the 
willingness and ability to augment his position of 
authority. Brezhnev was a devout communist, but a realist 
in the sense that he advocated co-existence (rather than 
unilateral antagonism) with the United States. 
Within the various dichotomies ascribed to interest 
groups or factions in Soviet politics, Brezhnev has been 
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classified: a "dove," as opposed to a "hawk"; 26 a 
"realist," as opposed to a "traditionalist"; 27 "reformist," 
as opposed to "orthodox"; 28 a "diplomatist," as opposed to 
"conservative."29 and, "pragmatist," as opposed to 
"conservative."30 
On a more personal level, Brezhnev was egotistical, 
had a thirst for power, was unfavorable toward change, and 
not a man of great intellect. According to Shevchenko, who 
knew Brezhnev on a personal basis, 
Brezhnev's vanity was gargantuan and he was happy to 
nurture his own "cult of personality." His immodest 
behavior and the marks of undeserved distinctions 
and honors which he awarded himself were disgusting 
to many; in his love for praise, medals and honorary 
posts he surpassed even Khrushchev.31 
Brezhnev's conservatism was partly a reflection of his 
own background and the aging generation of the Stalin era, 
members of which included Brezhnev and most of his Politburo 
cadres. The average age of full (voting) members of the 
Politburo rose from 58 to 68 from 1966 to July 1978, while 
the average age of candidate (non-voting) members rose from 
53 to 65 during the same period. 32 As Shevchenko notes: 
The old men . . . had settled into an intensely 
conservative pattern ... , in which they feared and 
would not tolerate any changes or new ideas; they 
liked the reassurance of familiar slogans repeated 
and repeated . 33 
Brezhnev had learned early on how to survive in the 
system as a Party apparatchik during the Stalin purges of 
the 1930s. He moved up through the ranks of the Party 
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hierarchy not as an intellect or an innovator, but by 
cultivating his political connections and winning the favor 
of Khrushchev. Thus, as Shevchenko explains, "Brezhnev was 
simply one among many ordinary faces that from time to time 
appeared and disappeared on the political horizon." 34 Even 
as a Party leader, " ... it was clear to all who knew him 
that he was a man of limited intellect and ability." 3 !5 
Brezhnev and SALT I 
Perhaps, the three principle characteristics of the 
Brezhnev regime as they relate to SALT were the constraints 
prompted by intra-factional debate within the top 
leadership, 36 the economic priorities of the leadership, and 
the building of Brezhnev's power base during that period. 
The Soviet decision to enter into negotiations with the 
United States appears to have been made during a period when 
Brezhnev had yet to achieve preeminence in the Politburo, 
thus allowing considerable internal debate over policy 
choices. As Wolfe suggests the months between President 
Johnson's invitation to the Soviets to begin negotiations in 
January 1967 and the first Soviet announcement of their 
willingness to negotiate in June 1968 were marked by an 
internal debate within the leadership on the issue of arms 
control.3 7 Since Brezhnev's position was not firmly 
established until 1971, the early phases of SALT were 
influenced by this debate. This is evidenced by a "hold and 
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explore" behavior, discussing issues in generalities, and a 
tentativeness as to whether SALT should continue past the 
first round.3e 
Although Brezhnev was Party Secretary General, he did 
not yet dominate foreign policy. This area, which included 
SALT, was directed by Premier Alexei Kosygin until 1971. 39 
The fact that Kosygin was also "pro-arms control," however, 
and the fact that a pro-arms control policy eventually won 
out, cannot entirely explain Brezhnev's eventual domination 
over foreign policy. 
Clearly the difference between the two leaders lay in 
their motives for arms control, with Brezhnev's ascendancy 
being a tribute to his ability to manage competing interests 
while strengthening his own position. Kosygin linked arms 
control to the reallocation of resources to light industry 
and consumer satisfaction. Brezhnev was committed to a 
detente as part of a strategy to slow down U.S. military 
programs, but also to maintain a high rate of development in 
heavy industry. 
To the military this direction was somewhat of a 
departure from building a "favorable" relationship of 
forces, but it was acceptable in comparison to that of 
Kosygin. With the tenacious baking of the military Brezhnev 
succeeded in cutting back increased military spending in 
1970. 40 Brezhnev gained further domination over the 
military when the 24th Party Congress in 1971 failed to 
elect Dmitri Ustinov, head of the armaments industry, to 
full membership in the Politburo. 
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By mid-1971 Brezhnev had consolidated his own position 
but was bound by the constraints of having to appeal to 
several interests.4 1 His credibility at home, particularly 
with the pro-defense groups, made a SALT agreement all the 
more a priority. Assuming that Brezhnev correctly perceived 
a SALT treaty as essential to Nixon's re-election, 42 the 
motivation for the signing of SALT in 1972, prior 
to the November elections, is clearer still. 
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES 
It is generally accepted that the period of SALT I was 
associated with a detente; 43 overall, a positive period in 
East/West relations. The subsystem data for 1969 through 
1972 support this association (see Table I in the Appendix}. 
The significance of this association, however, depends upon 
whether detente acted more as a determinant of SALT. Viewed 
from the domestic perspective, the pursuit of a SALT 
agreement was the keystone of detente; the agreements 
themselves affirmed its reality and promoted its viability. 
The subsystem perspective, however, presents a different 
view. Detente was responsible for the success of SALT. No 
matter how much policies toward an arms agreement were 
encouraged domestically, SALT codified detente but did not 
initiate it. 
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Although the SALT process had been set in motion 
during the Johnson administration, with preparations 
underway for a US/Soviet summit meeting in the fall of 1968, 
the political conditions were not yet conducive to bringing 
the two sides to the negotiating table for formal talks. 
The summit meeting was canceled by Johnson supposedly in 
response to Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia. 
Surely this event did nothing to promote East/West 
relations, but neither did it reflect overall changes in the 
subsystem relationships. 
By 1968 there had been a general, albeit slow movement 
toward an East/West detente, though much of the cold war 
tensions remained. A number of changes in the international 
political environment can be cited which encouraged this 
detente: a growing rift in Sino/Soviet relations; a 
European desire to relax East/West tensions, particularly on 
the issue of German reunification; the questionable future 
of NATO, caused by tensions both within Western Europe and 
between the European allies and the United States over such 
issues as the European Economic Community (EEC) and European 
integration, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the unilateral 
decision by the United States to adopt a "flexible response'' 
strategy for the defense of the alliance. 
The perceived missile gap of the early 1960s had been 
replaced by a perceived stability in the military balance, 
although technological advances in nuclear weaponry (ABM, 
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MIRVs, new strategic bombers, and ICBMs) threatened to 
disrupt that balance in the near future. With the continued 
buildup of Soviet strategic forces, the United States was 
being forced to accept the concept of parity in its 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Detente really did not 
begin to build momentum until after 1967. In December of 
that year NATO adopted a new strategic policy of "flexible 
response" and approved the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks 
of the Alliance. West European security concerns were 
heightened as a result of the new strategy which was 
perceived by many as America's growing unwillingness to 
defend Europe in the event of a Soviet move into Europe. 
"Flexible response" was also seen as making conventional war 
in Europe more likely. As Kissinger described the strategy, 
The strategy had been accepted by our European 
allies with extreme uneasiness and only after a 
debate extending five years. They saw it correctly-
-as the symptom of growing reluctance by the United 
States to use its nuclear forces. 44 
The Harmel Report stated that "military security and a 
policy of detente are not contradictory but complimentary," 
and that "allies are not obliged to subordinate their 
policies to collective decision." 4 ~ The significance of the 
Report was that it explicitly called for an alliance policy 
based on "parallel courses" rather than, what Beers terms, a 
"common tack." 46 Western Europe would no longer be obliged 
to simply mirror U.S. policy, but would, with U.S. 
endorsement, pursue a more independent course toward common 
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goals. Although the Report may have alleviated somewhat the 
tensions between the United States and Western Europe, by 
formally opening the way for a more active West European 
process of normalization with the East new tensions arose in 
the alliance relationship over how best to achieve detente, 
and the pace at which detente would be pursued. 
DeGaulle had already made it clear that France 
intended to pursue its own course independent from U.S. 
policy, and had conveyed France's desire to seek better 
relations with the Soviet Union. 47 West Germany began a 
more active attempt of its own to further detente. In 1968, 
while Germany was still "being officially branded as a 
hostile power seeking revenge and restoration of territorial 
losses ... ," 48 by the end of 1969 German Chancellor 
Brandt's "Ostpolitik'' was in full swing. And the Soviets 
were responding with equal enthusiasm. The success of a 
European detente, however, particularly for West Germany, 
rested on greater US/Soviet cooperation. West European 
pressure on the United States to actively engage in arms 
control was thus intensified. The United States, taking a 
slower, more cautious approach to detente, nonetheless took 
great note of its allies' concerns, if only for the 
threatening implications that a separate West 
European/Soviet detente had for U.S. security. 
As the Soviet Union pursued a "selective detente" 
policy49 --to divide the alliance by courting Western Europe, 
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the United States feared the possibilities of rising German 
nationalism,oo West European neutralism, 01 and an eventual 
"finlandization" of Western Europe. 02 Within this political 
atmosphere the United States was faced with a challenging 
dilemma: 
how to maintain security while seeking to improve--
for the first time--systematically--relations with 
the East: how to reconcile our solidarity (alliance 
unity) with a policy of detente.0 3 
Kissinger's words not only reflect the policy dilemma 
facing the United States at that time, but the fact that it 
was viewed as a dilemma demonstrates both the priority of 
alliance unity in U.S. security policy and the indirect role 
of Western Europe on U.S. policymaking. Whereas in 1968 the 
United States was willing to hold back on arms control, as 
it was apparently in the first months of the Nixon 
administration, the political environment by late 1969 
favored SALT negotiations as the logical policy alternative. 
By the time of the opening round of talks in November 1969 
the subsystem environment was characterized by a slightly 
positive, but cautious adversarial relationship, a generally 
positive alliance relationship, but with strong underlying 
negative elements, and a relatively high degree of positive 
behavior in the alliance/adversary relationship (see 
Appendix Table II). 
The second and third rounds of SALT in 1970, by 
contrast, took place amidst a slightly negative adversarial 
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relationship, and a highly positive alliance/adversary 
relationship (see Appendix Table III). This change in 
conditions featured U.S. expansion of the Vietnam War into 
Cambodia, signs of crisis in the Middle East, Soviet 
criticism of movement toward a US/Chinese rapprochement, 
growing West European independence from U.S. policy, and 
continued Soviet effort to lure Western Europe away from the 
United States. 
Clearly the latter feature was most evident during 
SALT, demonstrated by Soviet positions on such issues as 
ABMs, MR/IRBMs, FBS, and British and French nuclear forces. 
While the Europeans generally welcomed SALT as being 
"consonant with efforts to secure a more general relaxation 
of East/West tensions," they were concerned that a SALT 
treaty "might sacrifice some part of its (American) 
capability to protect allies," including their own 
capability to protect themselves.~ 4 
At the outset of SALT the Soviets raised the issue of 
American Forward-Based Systems (an area of U.S. advantage), 
demanding that they be included in any agreement limiting 
nuclear weapons systems. At the same time they insisted 
that their medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe not 
be included. This they justified by their own definition of 
strategic weapons. Puzzled by this Soviet behavior Smith 
asks, what did the Soviets expect to gain by raising this 
issue? Attempting an answer he concludes that, 
because the allies were so adamant about any reduction in 
the U.S. commitment to Western Europe.~ 6 
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Another West European concern, one closely linked to 
the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France, was 
the ABM issue. Not only were the development and deployment 
of U.S. defensive systems perceived by Europeans as a move 
to ''insulate" the United States from its allies, but a 
Soviet defensive capability was seen as a threat to the 
utility of British and French forces.~ 7 Obviously even a 
limited number of Soviet ABMs would have a significant 
effect on the comparatively small forces of Britain and 
France combined. The Soviet proposal calling for joint 
retaliation against any country launching a provocative 
attack further aggravated the British and French situations 
by indirectly constraining the utility of their forces. 
While the proposal was also directed at the Chinese, the 
Soviets had likely considered the benefits of both. 
The FBS debate continued into the third round of talks 
in November 1970 as both sides held to earlier positions. 
In December a Soviet proposal was conveyed via the 
delegation heads that upon completion of an agreement both 
sides would agree to adhere to a no first-strike policy. 
This proposal was clearly designed with' the aim of isolating 
Western Europe. For the United States to officially adopt 
such a policy would have antagonized the allies even more 
than "flexible response" had. The U.S. response to the 
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proposal was predictable. " it would be inconsistent 
with defensive commitments to our allies . "~ 8 
The friction in the alliance relationship during 1970, 
however, was not entirely negative. It would be more aptly 
described as confused--neutral, but volatile; equally likely 
to improve or worsen. Even as the United States was urging 
its allies to increase their share of the cost of defense 
and cautioning them against being too quick to pursue 
detente, it was also nurturing their trust through the 
reassurances of close consultation and the affirmation of 
its alliance commitments in SALT. 
Early in 1969 Nixon had promised the allies full 
consultation. The U.S. SALT delegation stopped first in 
Brussels en route to Helsinki to confer with the allies. 
Thereafter, briefings on the negotiations and U.S. positions 
were carried out on a regular basis. Nixon also kept his 
promise for an extensive visit to Europe early in his first 
term. Before his trips to China and Moscow Nixon consulted 
at length with allied leaders at the White House. Although 
some NATO members found that consultations with the Nixon 
administration were "little more than a willingness to 
inform others what it had already decided to do," 
consultations were somewhat successful in calming allied 
"nervousness."~9 
The West Europeans were in an uneasy position. As 
noted earlier, although they welcomed SALT, they remained 
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apprehensive about a US/Soviet agreement which might lessen 
America's alliance commitment. Furthermore, any desire they 
may have had to take on a larger role in NATO policymaking 
and a more independent role in providing for their own 
defense, was contradicted by the desires for a detente and 
the undesirable costs of assuming a greater defensive role. 
They too fully understood the political implications of an 
East/West detente. As Kissinger later warned, "an 
atmosphere of detente removes the previous urgency for 
allied cohesion."60 
The West European/Soviet detente, however, was 
sustained through 1970 with the alliance/adversary 
relationship overall a positive one (see Appendix Table 
III). Among the more positive events were the opening of 
bilateral negotiations between East and West Germany, the 
beginning of four-power negotiations on Berlin, positive 
movement toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
(MBFR) , and the signing of non-aggression treaties between 
the Soviet Union and West Germany. In October France and 
the Soviet Union signed an accord to further develop and 
expand relations, and to have periodic consultations. 
Despite the passivity in SALT during 1970, much 
progress was made in 1971, culminating in the SALT I 
treaties of 26 May 1972. This period is associated with an 
overall positive subsystem environment (see Appendix Tables 
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IV and V). The United States and the Soviet Union engaged 
in a higher level of cooperation despite counter-productive 
events (i.e., U.S. moves toward mending relations with the 
PRC, and the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports. 
The political environment in which SALT was achieved 
had thus been established. Ostpolitik relied on US/Soviet 
cooperation for momentum. The United States relied on 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to maintain some 
control over Ostpolitik and alliance unity. The Soviet 
Union relied on cooperation both with the United States and 
Western Europe in order to relax NATO's raison d'etre and 
constrain U.S. military programs. SALT I was thus greatly 
facilitated because the interaction of each actor's security 
concerns, and their attendant policies, created conditions 
favorable for arms control. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewed solely from the domestic perspective, SALT I 
was the keystone of detente. Implicit in this view is the 
belief that without the political forces within the United 
States and the Soviet Union acting in favor of SALT detente 
would have quickly become a dead issue. Certainly the 
coincidence of SALT and the blossoming of the detente era is 
strong evidence in favor of this position. In addition, 
since the policies of the Nixon administration and that of 
Brezhnev both embraced philosophies of international order 
based on adaptation, peaceful coexistence, and conflict 
management, in which arms control played a key role, it is 
not difficult to arrive at conclusions which define the 
success of SALT I as the result of bilateral relations. 
This view, however, would be only partially correct. 
47 
If the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet 
Union by 1969 were compelled toward cooperation and 
conciliation, they must be seen as adapting and reacting to 
sub-systemic influences more than the results of bilateral 
or domestic factors. 
The Ostpolitik of Western Europe somewhat frustrated 
the implementation of Kissinger's balance of power 
philosophy in which Western Europe was subjugated to U.S. 
policy. Western Europe was advancing its own policy of 
detente separate from U.S. policy. Western Europe saw SALT 
as a way to allay its own fears of entrapment. The Soviet 
Union reacted by encouraging closer ties with Western 
Europe. SALT was used as a carrot to court Western Europe 
and divide the alliance. The United States reacted by using 
SALT as a means of controlling alliance solidarity and West 
European/Soviet ties. 
According to the data in Figure 2, US/Soviet relations 
peaked in 1971, but were slipping as the SALT I treaties 
were signed. Alliance relations appear to parallel 
US/Soviet relations while West European/Soviet relations run 
contrary. 
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This supports the thesis that SALT I was preceded by 
an environmental movement toward East/West detente already 
underway by the late 1960s. SALT I negotiations were 
motivated by security perceptions, particularly those of 
Western Europe, that sought an end to East/West 
confrontation. By 1970 alliance relations were low as the 
United States and Western Europe followed distinct Soviet 
policies. Western Europe pursued Ostpolitik in reaction to 
its concerns of entrapment. Accordingly, the Soviet Union 
welcomed Ostpolitik. The United States, responding to 
allied concerns and its own concern over warming West 
European/Soviet relations, initiated SALT negotiations in 
1969. Alliance relations and US/Soviet relations rose 
accordingly. Detente was a result of these changed 
relationships. SALT I was the product of detente. 
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CHAPTER III 
SALT II 
THE ISSUES OF SALT II 
Less than six months after SALT I became official U.S. 
and Soviet negotiating teams arrived in Geneva to begin SALT 
II. 1 For the most part, these negotiations took place 
within the framework of SALT I, the main objective being to 
replace the Interim Agreement (due to expire in five years) 
with a more comprehensive one that would remain in force for 
a substantially longer period. Issues that were either put 
off in SALT I (FBS, MR/IRBMs, MIRVs, Soviet MLBMs) or not 
yet deemed strategically or technologically essential to the 
purpose of SALT I {Backfire Bomber, cruise missiles, or the 
MX--"Missile Experimental") were brought up in SALT II. 
Of immediate concern in SALT II was what many American 
strategic planners and politicians alike saw as the failure 
of SALT I; solving the problem of Soviet "heavies--their 
MLBMs. 2 These missiles, they argued, threatened the 
retaliatory utility of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs--the 
backbone of the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. 
Some limitation or reduction of these missiles quickly 
became a U.S. priority, particularly in light of the fact 
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that the Soviet Union would be left free to MIRV them. 
Although U.S. MIRV technology far exceeded that of the 
Soviet Union during SALT I (which was one justification for 
the launcher inequality in the Interim Agreement), it was 
argued that once the Soviets did begin MIRVing, U.S. 
missiles would be placed in an inferior position. 
Because of this growing criticism of SALT I, Congress 
had mandated that future agreements be arrived at on the 
basis of numerical parity, or "equal aggregates.'' 3 a This 
meant taking into consideration both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons systems (i.e., 
launchers, warheads, missiles, throw-weight, range, 
accuracy) . 
By June 1973 some general guidelines were worked out 
between Nixon and Brezhnev in Washington D.C. Together they 
agreed to work toward permanent ceilings on offensive 
strategic forces (including qualitative factors), and toward 
a real mutual reduction of those forces. They also agreed 
upon 1974 as a deadline for concluding a SALT II treaty. By 
the summer of 1974, however, negotiations were bogged down. 
But despite Nixon's resignation from office in August, 
efforts to continue the SALT process were not given up. In 
fact, what was generally accepted as a "get acquainted 
meeting" between President Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok, 
turned out to be a significant step forward for SALT. 
Principles agreed upon at Vladivostok gave a new impetus to 
progress in SALT and set the stage for the next four years 
of negotiations. 
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A ceiling was established at 2400 for total offense 
nuclear launch vehicles, with a sub-ceiling of 1320 
launchers for MIRVs. The Soviets dropped their demand that 
an agreement include American FBS. In return, the United 
States agreed not to press for a reduction in Soviet 
"heavies." The ceiling of 2400 would also include heavy 
bombers, a category in which the United States had 
superiority. A new deadline for concluding an agreement was 
set for the end of 1975. 
Two issues quickly became a major stumbling block for 
the remainder of SALT II--the Soviet Backfire Bomber, and 
the cruise missile. 4 The problems were primarily ones of 
definition. The Backfire's unique characteristics gave it a 
medium bomber status, though it had intercontinental 
{strategic) capabilities. The cruise missile {still in the 
developmental stage in 1974) did not have the range or speed 
of ballistic missiles or heavy bombers. But it could strike 
the Soviet Union from forward bases in Europe. Thus, by 
Soviet definition, the cruise missile was a strategic 
weapon. In addition, 30-40 air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCMs) could be delivered by one bomber, a feature on which 
grounds the Soviets insisted that such a bomber be counted 
in the MIRV launcher sub-ceiling. 
While the delegations in Geneva marked time discussing 
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less ambiguous issues, no headway was made during 1975 on 
the "gray area" status of the Backfire and cruise missiles.~ 
In January 1976, Kissinger flew to Moscow anxious to break 
the impasse and reach an agreement. The result of his 
meeting was an understanding that the United States would 
count heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles within the 
MIRV launcher ceiling of 1320 if the Soviets would accept 
limitations on the Backfire. This understanding, however, 
was never allowed to provide the breakthrough in 
negotiations that Kissinger had hoped for. His concession 
on the cruise missile was subsequently blocked by internal 
pressure in the United States. 6 In February the United 
States offered a counterproposal that the Vladivostok 
agreements be ratified with a temporary resolution of the 
Backfire and cruise issues. The Soviets rejected the 
proposal claiming they had made a deal with Kissinger. 
Finally, with another treaty deadline past, the 
negotiations moved through an ambiguous phase until March 
1977. The Carter administration then focused on three 
options: "Basic Vladivostok"--more or less what Kissinger 
had arranged in January 1976; "Vladivostok Plus"--including 
some accommodation of the Backfire, and: "Vladivostok 
Minus"--excluding the Backfire and the cruise missile. The 
final decision became the "Comprehensive Proposal" which: 
reduced both total launcher and MIRV launcher ceilings; 
added a sub-ceiling of 550 for MIRVed ICBMs; reduced the 
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number of Soviet heavy bombers to 150 (from 300); limited 
the flight testing of existing ICBMs; banned mobile and new 
ICBMs, and; excluded further limitations on the Backfire, if 
the Soviets would restrict its mission to tactical only. 
All cruise missiles would be limited to a range no greater 
than 2500 km., but deployment of ground-launched cruise 
missiles (GLCMs) would be acceptable in West Germany. The 
Soviets rejected the proposal. 
Over the next two years the two sides did manage to 
converge on several issues. In April 1978 Secretary of 
State Vance visited Moscow in an attempt to resolve the 
remaining problem areas. There was hope that a summit 
meeting, and possibly a treaty, could be arranged by summer. 
The United States agreed to a lowered ceiling of 2250 total 
nuclear launch vehicles (but higher than the Comprehensive 
Proposal) and the Soviets agreed to a 1200 MIRV launcher 
ceiling. They also dropped a demand that transfer of 
weapons systems and technology be banned. In its place a 
U.S. proposed "circumvention" clause was adopted. 
In May 1978 the Soviets accepted a freeze on the 
maximum number of warheads per missile, the limit based on 
the present number of warheads on each missile. The Soviets 
then proposed a ban on flight testing and deployment of all 
new ICBMs except one, which would be limited to a single 
warhead missile. This was unacceptable to the United States 
since it would have blocked the MX missile which had ten 
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warheads. In July, however, the Soviets compromised and 
agreed to allow one new ICBM, MIRVed or not. The United 
States agreed, and at the same time abandoned a similar 
proposal of its own to ban new SLBMs. Such a ban would have 
blocked the Trident II program. 
By early September 1978 a treaty seemed to be within 
reach. The United States approached Moscow with a ''package" 
deal with all but a few issues remaining to be resolved. 
Over the next few months the talks focused on cruise 
missiles, the Backfire, and treaty verification. In late 
September the Soviets offered to drop their 2500 km. limit 
on ALCMs in exchange for a "straight line" range limit on 
GLCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) . 7 Shortly 
thereafter, the Soviets dropped the 2500 km. limit on GLCMs 
and SLCMs in return for a U.S. agreement to a 600 km. limit 
in the protocol of the treaty. The Soviets did not, 
however, drop their right to upgrade the Backfire. 
An October meeting in Moscow focused primarily on the 
issue of verification. In response to the Soviet practice 
of encrypting some of its missile testing telemetry, the 
United States insisted on banning any encryption that would 
impede ''national means" of verification. This would be 
accomplished by the inclusion of a clause (similar to one in 
SALT I) that prohibited the deliberate concealment of 
missile telemetry which might impede verification. By 
December the verification issue, plus a U.S. insistence that 
a treaty include a Soviet statement of non-strategic 
intentions for the Backfire, stalled the talks again. By 
the end of 1978, as expectations mounted for a summit 
meeting, and a treaty, the talks were delayed for another 
six months. Following almost weekly negotiations, the 
remaining issues were worked out and SALT II was finally 
signed on 18 July 1979. 
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The treaty kept the 2400 ceiling on total launchers, 
but included a reduction to 2250 by 1 January 1981. The 
sub-ceiling for MIRVs stayed at 1320, and included heavy 
bombers equipped for cruise missiles with a range over 600 
km. A limit was set at 28 ALCMs per bomber. Both GLCMs and 
SLCMs were limited to 600 km. in the protocol to the treaty, 
which would remain in force until 31 December 1981, unless 
replaced by an earlier agreement. MIRV launcher sub-
ceilings were set at 1200 for ICBMs, SLBMs, and Air to 
Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), and at 820 for ICBMs 
only. Each side was allowed to determine its own mix within 
those limitations. No new type of ICBM was allowed, except 
one new "light" ICBM. The number of MIRV warheads was 
capped at existing numbers. 
Limitations were also agreed upon for modernization, 
relocation, conversion, and reloading of ICBM launchers. 
The circumvention clause was retained in Article 12 of the 
treaty, as was the U.S. insistence to include a "no 
deliberate concealment measures" clause in Article 14. 
Article 19 set the expiration date for the treaty at 31 
December 1985. 
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The treaty also included a Soviet Statement that the 
intercontinental capabilities of the Backfire would not be 
utilized, and that its production rate would not exceed 
thirty planes per year. President Carter included a 
statement that the United States considered these Soviet 
commitments on the Backfire "to be essential to the 
obligations assumed under the Treaty." Finally a Joint 
Statement on Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent 
Negotiations was included with a reference to further 
resolution of the issues designated in the protocol. 
Senate debate over SALT II ratification immediately began 
following the treaty signing and continued for the remainder 
of 1979. 8 By Christmas recess, SALT II had not yet been 
brought to a vote, and subsequently was never ratified. 
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE 
Nixon (1973-1974) 
By the time of the opening round of SALT II Nixon had 
been re-elected by a landslide majority. 9 Having 
interpreted the overwhelming victory as a clear mandate for 
his policies, Nixon continued to govern in much the same 
manner and style. By the end of January 1973, however, 
Nixon's popularity among the American public declined 
steadily. Following his April speech regarding the 
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Watergate break-in, that rating dropped to its lowest point 
since taking office.10 
Regarding SALT II, the effect of Watergate on U.S. 
arms control behavior must be seen as minimal, at least 
until the summer of 1974. Nixon's approach was business as 
usual. It may be speculated, however, that the 1973 summit 
was purposefully predisposed toward conciliation and highly 
celebrated in order to distract attention from Watergate, 
thus highlighting the success of the administration's 
foreign policy. Whether or not this was the case in 1973, 
it seems more probable that the 1974 summit in Moscow had 
such motivations. The Soviets by then, however, could not 
have realistically agreed to further arms control measures 
in light of the overwhelming uncertainty facing U.S. 
leadership. Despite the high expectations and publicity 
surrounding the summit, very little was accomplished. 
The Ford Administration 
"Gerald Ford, the first appointed American President, 
a pleasant, dull, open-faced man ... ,"assumed the office 
of President on 8 August 1974. 11 Contrary to what has been 
considered an interregnum, 12 the Ford administration, at 
least in regard to foreign policy, represented a 
continuation of the policies of the Nixon administration. 
The SALT II negotiations were absent of any radical 
departure from the Nixon years. Ford retained Kissinger as 
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Secretary of State. Ford's instructions were to move ahead 
with SALT where Nixon had left off. 13 The Vladivostok 
meeting, coming just a few months after Ford assumed office, 
is demonstrative of the Ford administration's desire to 
maintain consistency and continuity in arms control policy. 
It is also reflective of the desire to renew a detente that 
was becoming increasingly a target of domestic criticism. 
There were, of course, several real constraints on the 
Ford Presidency. Beside the fact that he was not elected, 
there was the debate over the possible consequences of the 
U.S. incursion into Cambodia, and later the U.S. withdrawal 
from Vietnam. These issues, together with the Watergate 
affair, severely undermined the Office of the President, at 
home and abroad. 
Ford also had to deal with stronger Democratic 
majorities in both houses of Congress. The composition of 
the 94th Congress following the 1974 elections included more 
than a twenty percent increase in House Democrats as well as 
establishing a commanding sixty percent Democratic majority 
in the Senate.14 
Ford thus found it difficult to continue the policies 
of his predecessor. The 1975 deadline for a SALT II treaty, 
set at Vladivostok, came and went with no sign of a 
breakthrough in negotiations. Kissinger, whose association 
with the Nixon era, and whose world views had become 
associated with America's failure in Vietnam, also came 
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under attack. In Richard Barnet's words, "the man who made 
foreign policy famous no longer seemed to be able to make 
foreign policy." 1 ~ Unable to find a compromise solution to 
the negotiating obstacles posed by the Backfire and cruise 
missile, Kissinger visited Moscow in January 1976 to attempt 
a last ditch effort. 
Once again the predisposition toward election year 
politics was an important motivating factor in the pursuit 
of a SALT agreement. As Ford himself alluded to, 
A SALT accord had been eluding us for more than a 
year, and it was vital that we make a final attempt 
to bridge our differences over the Backfire and 
cruise. success with SALT ... would go a long way 
toward ensuring my election in 1976.16 
By 1976, however, detente, SALT, and Kissinger were 
under attack from members of both major parties. By March 
detente was a term no longer in vogue, and even Ford 
discarded it from his campaign rhetoric. 17 Criticism of 
detente, as a one-way street in favor of the Soviet Union, 
was substantiated by Soviet actions in Angola and the 
detection of new Soviet missile deployments. 
SALT negotiations continued. But as Talbott has 
observed, "Kissinger was on a shorter leash ... as he 
negotiated with Gromyko." 19 Kissinger's attempt at a treaty 
by agreeing to limitations on the cruise missile was viewed 
by many U.S. policymakers as an unacceptable concession to 
the Soviets. Mounting domestic pressures against detente 
disallowed an American compromise in SALT. The Soviets, on 
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the other hand, seemed content to hold out for a favorable 
arms control deal in a U.S. election year. SALT II was thus 
resigned to an ambiguous state until March 1977. 
The Carter Administration 
According to some post-presidential analyses, Jimmy 
Carter has been described, in most general terms, as "a good 
man," but with "little sense of direction." 19 While this 
description is simplistic, it does capture the ambiguity and 
vacillation associated not just with the man, but with the 
administration and its policies. The question that must be 
asked then, is to what degree were these characteristics a 
part of Carter's personality, his political style, his 
participation in decisionmaking, and the constraints on his 
scope of authority? Certainly Carter's low leadership 
rating was, in part, a reaction to his own ambivalence and 
naivete. That ambivalence, a feature of the Carter 
administration in general, must also be seen as a reflection 
of a larger political milieu. In foreign policy Carter fell 
victim to his own perceptions of the world. But he also 
fell victim to the political environment in which he 
governed. 
The image of Jimmy Carter as a "good man" reflects his 
honesty, his open morality, and sincere desire to solve the 
problems that beset the world. He was the "unknown 
candidate," a "slender peanut farmer with sandy hair and 
gleaming teeth" who had, 
run against Washington . . . promising a government 
as good as the people, in which the President would 
keep his office door open and never lie. 20 
These personal characteristics were undoubtedly 
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important factors in Carter's election in the post-Watergate 
era. But these same characteristics tended to work against 
him once he assumed office. The political realities of 
foreign policy, of which he had limited experience, 
conflicted with his conscience; a conflict he was unable to 
reconcile. As Barnet notes, 
Jimmy Carter turned out to be a man who abounded in 
good qualities he could neither discipline nor 
integrate. A decent, genuinely moral man, his 
success in translating his morality into politics 
was limited .... By the end of his term the image 
of steely determination and managerial competence 
had given way to one of vacillation and confusion. 21 
This was evident in Carter's foreign policy. As 
Barnet continues, "the foreign policy mirrored the man. 
admirable goals, like his own admirable character traits, 
collided with one another."2 2 
As the first post-Watergate President, Carter's 
authority was closely scrutinized, under the watchful eye of 
the public and Congress. Carter's personality obliged the 
scrutiny. In contrast to Nixon, Carter invited a broad 
policy input from the Executive and the Legislative branches 
of government. Although he was obliged to adopt more of a 
consensus style of policymaking, he seemed naturally 
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inclined to rely on his advisors. Because of this style, 
policies were continually filled with ambiguities and 
inconsistencies; a natural result of trying to please 
everyone. As for his own input in foreign policy, Carter 
had little to offer, relying instead on a "cabinet 
government . "2 a 
Carter understood his own dilemma. In his memoirs, he 
expressed an uncertainty about the problems he faced as a 
result of Watergate and his own experience as an outsider 
among Washington social circles. He realized Congress would 
not "embrace me as a long-awaited ally in the Executive 
Branch."2 4 Although he benefitted from a Democratic 
majority in both Houses, his election had been a narrow 
one. 2 ~ As Carter recalls, 
I generally doubted that I had a broad public 
mandate to carry out the programs I had espoused. 26 
Carter and SALT II 
These characteristics of the Carter administration 
thus directly affected U.S. behavior in SALT II 
negotiations. Though little criticism can be leveled 
against Carter's desire that SALT be unique (his own 
formula), the U.S. position in SALT reflected an openness 
and ambivalence that frustrated America's allies, whose 
growing perceptions of insecurity demanded consistency and 
strong leadership from Washington. If Carter's foreign 
policy was predominately influenced by the Trilateral 
Commission (TriCom) as some have claimed, 27 then Carter's 
personal style and the political environment were out of 
sync with that policy. 
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Within the first week of his term, Carter ordered 
preparations for a renewal of SALT negotiations. Over the 
next several weeks, as Carter turned his attention to other 
foreign policy matters, SALT was left to the devices of 
various bureaucratic agencies. 28 The end result was the 
Comprehensive Proposal which went further than the 
Vladivostok accords by significantly lowering the 
established ceilings of nuclear weapons. 29 Despite the 
pressures to build an arms agreement on the basis of 
Vladivostok, Carter was determined to make SALT II his own. 
He refused to simply "cross the t's and dot the i's'' on a 
document that was mostly Kissinger's work. 30 
His campaign was, after all, largely critical of 
Kissinger, both in negotiating style and his world views. 
But Carter seemed to go out of his way to avoid actions that 
may have been likened to the two previous administrations. 
Ironically, the ''openness" and anti-Kissinger style proved 
to be a major source of the contradiction and ambivalence 
that the Carter administration exuded throughout the 
remainder of SALT II. 
One contradiction arose from the administration's 
aversion to the use of "linkage" in negotiating style. In 
part, due to the differences between Kissinger's world views 
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and those of Brzezinski's, any linkage of other issues to 
arms control simply made it more difficult to insulate arms 
control, and hence, to reach an agreement. The Carter 
administration soon found its policies at odds with one 
another as Carter's zeal for human rights adversely affected 
US/Soviet relations and progress in SALT II. 31 
Suspicions of the administration's openness were 
raised when, shortly before Secretary Vance was to present 
the Comprehensive Proposal to the Soviets in Moscow, Carter 
announced to the United Nations General Assembly the central 
features of the Proposal, plus fall back contingencies in 
the event the Soviet Union rejected it outright. This 
action may have been a result of the anti-secrecy uprising 
after Watergate and revelations of certain CIA operations. 
Carter may have felt he needed to appease the American 
public and restore some credibility to the Presidency. The 
primary motivation may have been Carter's own penchant for 
openness, morality, and honesty. 
Ironically, while the motivation was likely a 
combination of all these factors, the result was a 
strengthening of political ammunition for an increasing 
anti-detente sentiment within the United States. The 
discordant character of the domestic political attitude 
toward the expectations of the President and toward detente 
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simply compounded the political indecisiveness and ambiguity 
produced by Carter's moral passion to do the "right" thing. 
Pressures were mounting to appear tougher with the 
Soviet Union. Helmut Schmidt's speech criticizing a 
US/Soviet arms deal that sacrificed European security 
pointed up the growing concerns of NATO members. 
Domestically, pressures from newly created organizations 
such as the Committee on the Present Danger and Coalition 
for Peace Through Strength sought to re-address the 
perceived military weaknesses of the West. Production of 
the neutron bomb was adopted as the solution to the 
perceived imbalance in Europe, and as a bargaining chip in 
SALT. Having pressured West Germany into going along with 
the neutron bomb production, and possible deployment, Carter 
suddenly changed his mind and decided to cancel production. 
Once again perceptions of vacillation and confusion in the 
administration were the result. Carter simply did not want 
his administration labeled as one that made bombs "that kill 
people but leave buildings intact." 3 2 
Despite the signals of confusion, to allies and the 
Soviets alike, negotiations continued. Hopes were high for 
a summit meeting by summer 1978. With an upcoming 
Congressional election, however, there were hopes, even 
among those Senators in favor of SALT, that a treaty 
ratification debate could be delayed until after the 
election. As Vance suggests, there was a strong feeling 
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among pro-SALT Senators that their re-election rested, in 
part, on taking a harder line on Soviet policy33 
Failure to Ratify SALT II 
The achievement of a SALT treaty in June 1979, 
followed by the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify it, 
should not seem too surprising given the confusion and 
incoherence in Carter's foreign policy. On the one hand, 
the moral motivation to seek arms control, and the hopes 
that it would ensure a more trusting relationship between 
the superpowers, helped to overcome the many negotiating 
obstacles leading to an agreement. On the other hand, the 
anti-detente forces in the United States, strengthened by 
Soviet actions in Cuba and Afghanistan, had the effect of 
neutralizing any real trust between the two countries that 
the conclusion of the treaty may have provided.3 4 
Secretary Vance made clear the administration's desire 
for SALT II ratification when he stressed the need to 
appease the Senate. 
If Carter would decide to deploy the MX in a mobile 
basing mode, agree to an increase in the defense 
budget, and acquiesce in several conditions 
acceptable to the administration in the Resolution 
of Ratifications he would satisfy many of the 
critics. 3 ~ 
Vance argued that SALT II ratification failed not 
because of "fatal flaws" in the treaty itself, but because 
the opponents were successful in linking the treaty to the 
need to restrain Soviet actions in other countries.36 
Carter testifies to this argument in his memoirs, citing 
"the antagonism that Soviet action in Afghanistan had 
kindled in our country. "37 
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Rather than continue to pursue arms control for its 
own sake, moral or strategic, Carter had bowed to the 
linkage of SALT II and Afghanistan, a linkage for which he 
blames Congress. However, in a television speech on 4 
January 1980 Carter stated that "the world simply cannot 
stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with 
impunity. Neither the United States nor any other nation 
... can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet 
Union."38 
Carter had suddenly switched positions, joining those 
same critics who had argued that arms control must be used 
as a "carrot" to moderate Soviet behavior elsewhere. But 
1980 was also an election year, and Carter had decided not 
to risk def eat by pursuing an arms agreement he believed was 
the "most detailed, far-reaching, comprehensive treaty in 
the history of arms control," and an " ... absolute 
indispensable precondition for moving on to ... more 
significant cuts under SALT III."39 
Rather than appearing as if "I'm down in the trenches 
fighting for my political life," 40 during the 1980 campaign, 
Carter withdrew the SALT ratification vote from the Senate. 
Consistent with the characterization of his administration 
as one of vacillation, ambivalence, and ambiguity, Carter 
then imposed a U.S. grain embargo on the Soviet Union, 
further appeasing Soviet hard-liners in Congress, while 
isolating one of his natural constituents--the farmer. 
Brezhnev (1973-1979) 
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Throughout SALT II Brezhnev retained his position as 
the undisputed head of the Communist Party and as leader of 
the Soviet Union. The durability of his authority, however, 
rested not only on his ability to manage competing 
interests, but also on the success of ambitious domestic 
programs that relied heavily on factors not completely 
within his power to control. Perhaps the most important 
factor for Brezhnev was the continuation of detente. 
Domestic programs to improve consumer satisfaction and 
economic efficiency relied on favorable weather conditions 
for agricultural production, clearly a factor not within his 
control. Detente, however, was a somewhat more controllable 
factor. It was deemed essential to economic improvement 
since it was intended to provide the availability of Western 
capital, credit, technology, not to mention a more relaxed 
political atmosphere in which concentration on domestic 
programs could be more easily afforded. 
Both the weather and detente proved mostly favorable 
for the success of Brezhnev's programs in the first years of 
SALT II. Record harvests were recorded in 1973 and again in 
1976. Detente produced new trade agreements with the United 
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States, Western Europe, and Japan. On the negative side, 
however, the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking U.S. credits 
and trade to Soviet emigration policy, plus a severe drought 
in 1975, strengthened the position of Brezhnev's critics 
within the top leadership. 
Brezhnev's Detente Policy 
Following the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in February 
1976, Brezhnev's position emerged unchallenged. But it does 
seem likely that by 1976 there was serious doubt about both 
his ability to govern and the credibility of detente. The 
result of the SALT I debate among the Party leadership in 
1971 was a tentative compromise between pro-detente forces 
and the more orthodox ideologues. In exchange for support 
for his programs, Brezhnev was obliged to allow an 
increasingly broader participation of views in 
decisionmaking. In 1971 no Politburo position belonged to a 
ranking member of either the military or state security. 41 
By 1973 Marshall A. Grechko, the Minister of Defense, and Y. 
Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, were elevated to full 
Politburo status. Ustinov was later promoted to full 
membership in 1976.42 
The detente atmosphere began showing clear signs of 
erosion by 1976. Brezhnev's ability to rule was further put 
in question after he suffered a stroke in 1975 and was 
absent from office for several months. Despite the setbacks 
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Brezhnev remained committed to detente, "determined to push 
forward with an increasing dependence on foreign sources of 
capital, technology, and consumer goods." 43 He responded to 
political challenges against him with moves to reinstate and 
consolidate his own power. 44 By 1980, as Breslauer 
concludes, Brezhnev assured himself of "near-total consensus 
of perspectives'' among the top leadership. 4 5 
Brezhnev and SALT II 
Because of detente's key role in Brezhnev's domestic 
policies, it should not be surprising that there is some 
parallel between the leadership characteristics of the 
Brezhnev regime and Soviet behavior in arms control during 
SALT II. The first years following SALT I were marked by 
internal support for Brezhnev's policies, as well as the 
overall success of those policies. Amidst expanding trade 
and easing Soviet threat perceptions in the West, SALT 
proceeded smoothly through the 1973 summit and the 
Vladivostok agreements in 1974. 
The mid-SALT II period, however, was offset by a 
toughening of the Soviet negotiating position and subsequent 
stagnation period. This behavior corresponds to 
accommodations by Brezhnev to allow ranking military and 
state security members into the highest policymaking 
positions. It also corresponds to the weakening of 
Brezhnev's position following his stroke in 1975. In 
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addition, Soviet behavior must also be seen as reacting to 
U.S. politics, the succession of leadership, the rise of 
anti-detente attitudes, and Carter's human rights campaign. 
These factors could only have bolstered Brezhnev's critics, 
forcing a more cautious, tougher arms control position. 
The latter SALT II period coincides with Brezhnev's 
power consolidation in reaction to signs of failure with 
detente and its relation to the success of domestic 
programs. More military and traditionalist pressure at this 
time likely had the effect of compromising Brezhnev's 
detente policy for direct involvement in Afghanistan, Cuba, 
and a more rapid buildup of SS-20 missiles. Brezhnev's 
signature on SALT II must be seen then as a demonstration of 
his efforts at that time to re-establish his authority and 
to revive detente. Within the Party leadership, Brezhnev 
was moved to demonstrate to the "traditionalists" that the 
"realist" policy of detente was still the most viable 
solution to the domestic and foreign interests of the Soviet 
Union. 4 s 
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES 
SALT II began in an atmosphere of East/West 
cooperation (see Appendix Table V). To be sure, the fact 
that the conclusion of the SALT I agreements helped 
establish an optimistic beginning for SALT II cannot be 
ignored. The signing of SALT I codified the US/Soviet 
detente, and greatly contributed to furthering the West 
European/Soviet detente. But while there was, as yet, no 
cause for alarm in alliance relations (see Appendix Table 
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V) , the implications for the alliance in an atmosphere of 
detente were of some concern. The United States had 
negotiated and concluded an arms control agreement with the 
Soviet Union thus alleviating West European concerns about 
their own detente with the East. But would an expanded and 
more durable detente lead to a less dependent Western Europe 
on the United States, and instead, to closer ties and 
dependence on the Soviet Union? Could the two adversarial 
relationships, with their distinct interpretations of 
detente, maintain an environment of cooperation without 
negatively affecting alliance unity? SALT II became the 
forum both for testing alliance unity and detente. 
The Test of Detente 
In the 1970s detente and changing West European 
security perceptions created a dilemma for U.S. and Soviet 
policy in SALT II. Both arms control and detente are 
policies designed to maximize security by means of mutual 
restraint and cooperation. From the subsystem perspective, 
however, detente is afforded a different meaning to each 
actor. For the West, detente was never intended to carry 
adversarial cooperation to the point of alliance 
dissolution, though it sought to accommodate some West 
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European independence from the United States. For the most 
part, the American interpretation of detente was for both 
superpowers, through bilateral arrangements, "to act 
responsibly," and "not to try to change the balance of power 
through unilateral action." 47 
For the Soviets, detente sought to maximize tensions 
within the alliance and constrain American resolve against 
an expanded role in international affairs. As Ulam has 
explained Soviet policy, "detente is a process rather than a 
specific agreement, or sets of agreements." 48 Arms control 
agreements merely perpetuate detente so that broader goals 
may be realized. Within Hassner's offensive/defensive 
framework for Soviet policy, the Soviets sought to make 
unilateral gains as long as they perceived the West as 
divided and weak, and the United States unwilling or unable 
to provide the leadership necessary for alliance unity.49 
Griffiths draws a similar conclusion. From his analysis 
involving the domination of an ''activist trend" within the 
Soviet leadership, detente, as a policy of limited 
cooperation, 
serves as an effective form of conflict in that it 
creates an East-West climate favouring the 
exacerbation of internal differences within NATO, 
the defection of support for high levels of defense 
preparedness in the United States and Western 
Europe, and a reluctance on the part of Western 
governments to take action in local conflicts that 
jeopardizes the prospects for cooperation with the 
East .... 50 
For the Soviet Union, detente, via SALT, served as the 
79 
"diplomatic route'' to an improved international position. 
SALT served to disrupt alliance cohesion by acting upon West 
European concerns, and America's dilemma in dealing with 
them. This included continued cooperation with the United 
States, encouraging tensions between Western Europe and the 
United States, and accommodating a separate West European-
Soviet detente. Within the context of the alliance dilemma 
mentioned above, a dilemma for Soviet policy exists in much 
the same way as it does for the United States. West 
European fears of abandonment or entrapment may actually 
encourage alliance unity rather than disunity if Soviet 
actions are perceived as threatening West European security. 
This is the case whether Soviet policy emphasizes 
cooperation or conflict with the United States. 
Changed West European Security Concerns 
Much of SALT II can be viewed in the context of the 
opportunities and dilemmas that faced each actor as their 
security policies evolved during the 1970s. As the 
subsystem data support, the period of SALT II was 
accompanied by a general trend toward worsening adversarial 
relations (refer to Table VI in the Appendix, and Figure 2). 
SALT II reflected those trends. 
The continuation of the detente in which SALT II began 
was recognized by many as a major test for alliance unity. 
Concerned about unity, U.S. policy in 1973 stressed the 
reaffirmation of its relations with Western Europe. As 
Kissinger stated, 
We had decided to make 1973 the Year of Europe, to 
reaffirm our alliance ties with the Atlantic 
Community--and also Japan. We would show that these 
ties were stronger and deeper than the tentative new 
relations with Communist countries. On the basis of 
Alliance cohesion and vitality we would test the 
real opportunities for detente.~ 1 
Over the next few years alliance relations were 
severely tested. As Soviet policy took advantage of 
strained alliance relations, not to mention Soviet 
perceptions of American weakness in Vietnam, SALT II, in 
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turn was significantly affected. In 1973, the United States 
and the Soviet Union continued to expand areas of 
cooperation with nine separate agreements being signed 
during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting that summer. But 
while West Europeans generally welcomed arms control 
efforts, they viewed the fact that SALT II would be based on 
maintaining a strategic balance in mutual destructive 
capability with great caution. Without America's nuclear 
guarantee to rely on, they saw themselves more vulnerable to 
a Soviet threat, if not militarily, then certainly 
politically. 
One of the nine bilateral agreements signed during the 
summit, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 
"implied that the United States was more interested in 
Soviet-American arms control than its security commitment to 
NAT0."~ 2 The risk of nuclear destruction may have been 
81 
lessened somewhat by the agreement, but the extended nuclear 
guarantee to Western Europe was based on a ''non-commitment" 
to a no first-use strategy. This agreement seemed to 
undermine that strategy. 
Other events in the early 1970s further contributed to 
the erosion of Atlantic relations. In October 1973 the Arab 
oil embargo and the Israeli-Egyptian conflict highlighted 
the differences in strategic interests between the United 
States and Western Europe. Because of the disparity in 
dependence on OPEC oil, no common alliance action could be 
arranged. In lieu of a U.S. proposal for a counter-
coalition to OPEC, Western Europeans, seeing such an action 
as too great a risk, rushed to make bilateral deals with 
individual OPEC nations. Disagreement also arose over the 
issue of West European cooperation with the United States 
and its policy to aid Israel.~ 3 Still further anxieties 
developed over the lack of consultations or even an advance 
notice from the United States during the military alert of 
October 25th.~4 
Soviet and U.S. Reaction 
Following the climactic summit of 1973 SALT II 
negotiations stagnated until November 1974. During that 
time Soviet policy appeared all too willing to make demands 
on the United States that might create further divisions 
among NATO allies and force U.S. concessions in the arms 
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talks. Beside the speculative, perhaps more obvious motive 
to restrain potential Chinese nuclear capabilities, the 
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was also aimed at 
fueling West European concerns of abandonment. Beyond that, 
the Soviet Union continued to push the issue of American 
forward-based systems in Europe as it had during SALT I. 
At the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974, the 
Soviets dropped their FBS demand but acquired a U.S. 
agreement not to press for the inclusion of a Soviet cutback 
in ''heavy" missiles. From the subsystem perspective, the 
FBS issue must be seen as more than simply a Soviet 
bargaining chip in arms control negotiations. By remaining 
adamant on their FBS position the Soviets might have held 
out for U.S. concessions that sacrificed West European 
security. Indeed, the political gains from such a 
concession could have outweighed any quantitative or 
qualitative strategic arms limitation that the United States 
might have conceded. 
The United States, however, did not retreat from its 
promise to the allies not to negotiate weapons systems 
committed to the European theater. Such a stalemate in 
negotiations over the FBS issue would only have frustrated 
SALT II, and the Soviets required progress in arms control 
in order to keep detente alive. 
Because of the desire for continuity in detente, the 
Ford-Brezhnev meeting in Vladivostok, and the agreements 
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that accompanied it, were of no great surprise. For their 
own reasons, both the Ford administration and the Brezhnev 
regime were anxious to keep detente and arms control alive. 
Besides the agreed-upon ceilings for offensive systems, a 
new deadline for a SALT II treaty was set for 1975. SALT II 
had entered into a new phase with the basis of a treaty 
established at Vladivostok. Beneath this accomplishment, 
however, lay deeper political motivations and intentions. 
Despite the emerging criticisms of detente within the 
United States, and the political setback resulting from the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, the Soviet Union perceived its 
position in the world to be strengthening, while the West 
continued to show signs of weakness and disarray. 
Watergate, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, disunity 
in NATO over issues in Cyprus, Spain, and Portugal, and the 
economic and energy crises, all gave credence to Soviet 
perceptions that the "correlation of forces" had swung in 
their favor.~~ At the same time, Soviet policy continued to 
nurture its detente with Western Europe vis-a-vis the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and 
talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) . 
Two major obstacles to SALT II came to the foreground 
as a result of the change, or perceived changes, in the 
international environment. These were the Backfire bomber 
and the cruise missile. As was discussed earlier, the 
problem was one of definition; the weapons systems were 
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somewhere between strategic and tactical--in the "gray area" 
of arms control. The Vladivostok agreements had placed 
heavy bombers (strategic) under the 2400 launcher ceiling. 
This included the American B-52 and the Soviet Mya-4 and Tu-
20 (the Bison and the Bear). The U.S. F-111 was deployed in 
Europe, thus outside SALT II limitations. The B-1 was, as 
yet, in the developmental stages. The Backfire's 
characteristics, however, such as length, weight, wingspan, 
range, and payload, placed it in the gray area between 
medium and heavy. Although the Soviets claimed its 
intentions were for theater operations only, the Backfire 
had strategic capabilities.~ 6 
The Vladivostok agreements did not mention cruise 
missiles per se, although an agreement was made to include 
ballistic air-to-surf ace missiles of a range exceeding 600 
km. under the 2400 launcher ceiling.~ 7 Following 
Vladivostok, the Soviets interpreted the agreement as 
including cruise missiles, whereas the United States 
insisted upon no limitations.~ 8 
As Burt suggests, one of the possible motivations of 
the Soviets in demanding that all cruise missiles be limited 
was to restrict its potential deployment in a tactical, or 
European mode.~ 9 Because of the difficulty in cruise 
missile verification, any treaty would most likely have to 
count strategic and tactical deployments together. In this 
manner, the Soviets would have gained restrictions on 
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American FBS, thus feeding West European concerns of 
abandonment. At the same time, the Soviets would have been 
free to deploy the Backfire in a tactical mode, thus 
strengthening their European position, militarily and 
politically. 
Consistent with this thesis of Soviet motivation in 
SALT II was a rejection on their part in November 1975 of a 
U.S. compromise proposal to count both the cruise and 
Backfire "against one another in equal numbers above the 
2400 level under an additional ceiling of 200-300." 60 This 
ceiling would have only applied to longer range missiles and 
not to tactical versions. Throughout 1975, therefore, SALT 
II was inflicted with paralysis due to Soviet willingness to 
push for greater political gains encouraged by disunity 
within the United States, and between alliance partners. 
The Decline of Detente 
The era of detente had already reached its peak by 
1971 (see Figure 2) and by 1974 US/Soviet cooperation turned 
steadily toward conflict (see Appendix Tables VIII-XIII). 
Alliance relations stabilized somewhat by 1976 (see Figure 
2) and a greater sense of unity was restored amidst a 
renewed Western resolve against an increasing Soviet threat 
perception, particularly in Western Europe. 
In the 1976 Presidential campaign, detente became a 
term that was no longer politically advantageous to use. By 
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1978 Western Europe was in "open opposition" to SALT II and 
its implicit disregard for European security.61 NATO also 
agreed on the necessity to counter the buildup of Soviet 
forces in Europe, 62 particularly in light of continued 
Soviet deployments of the SS-20. 63 
By the late 1970s, Soviet policy was being forced to 
adapt to a changed environment. Western Europe was now 
asking the United States to readdress a perceived imbalance 
in Europe, which US/Soviet cooperation had failed to deal 
with. Supported by European fears, anti-detente forces in 
the United States were quick to adopt measures to deploy new 
weapons in Europe. The cruise missile, primarily a 
bargaining chip for Carter, was now seen as essential for 
European deployment. A new missile, the Pershing II, also 
was earmarked for Europe. 
In April 1978, the Soviets dropped their demand that 
weapons technology transfer be banned. In its place, a 
circumvention clause, favored by the United States, was 
used. In May the Soviets accepted a freeze on the number of 
warheads allowed per missile, and in July further 
compromises were worked out. In December, the United States 
demanded the inclusion of a Soviet Statement committing the 
Backfire to tactical usage only. A compromise was also 
reached on cruise missiles. 
In June 1979 SALT II was signed, though largely a 
result of changed political relationships. The two-track 
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decision of NATO re-established an alliance unity, albeit an 
ambiguous one, 64 not realized since the early 1970s. 
CONCLUSION 
As US/Soviet relations remained generally positive for 
the first few years after the signing of SALT I, it is 
interesting to note the coincidence between the negotiations 
and signing of SALT II, and the gradual decline of US/Soviet 
cooperation through the mid and latter 1970s. If the same 
argument is used that SALT was the keystone of detente, SALT 
II should have preserved, or even rejuvenated, positive 
US/Soviet relations. 
From the domestic perspective, it might be argued that 
it was the Carter administration's mishandling of arms 
control, bad negotiating, and misjudgment of Soviet 
intentions which brought about the strong reaction to 
detente. Again the argument is only partially correct. The 
subsystem perspective shows that the decline of detente and 
the failure of SALT II to be ratified were also due to 
changes in security perceptions. The Soviet buildup of SS-
20s and failure of SALT II to address European security 
concerns testifies to the fact that alliance solidarity was 
being weakened by East/West detente. Demands were then 
made, not for arms control, but for new arms deployments. 
While the Carter-Brezhnev summit in 1979 was highlighted by 
the signing of SALT II, NATO leaders and the United States 
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Congress were addressing concerns over American abandonment 
of Western Europe. 
The blame for the failure of SALT II, therefore, 
partly lies in the inability to have foreseen the possible 
or likely effects of detente from the viewpoint of the 
subsystem perspective. 
Not only did detente test alliance relations, but 
US/Soviet relations tested the durability of detente. Both 
domestic and subsystem factors played significant roles. 
The momentum of detente and SALT I carried over into 1974 
even as alliance unity was strained by the Arab oil embargo, 
the Israeli-Egyptian War, and Nixon's resignation. By the 
time of the Vladivostok meeting in 1974, all three 
relationships were on a positive trend (see Figure 2). 
Following Vladivostok, however, US/Soviet relations steadily 
declined while alliance relations vacillated up and down 
reflecting both growing concerns of abandonment and 
ambiguity and confusion in U.S. policy. 
The level of West European/Soviet cooperation fell as 
Western Europe became more fearful of Soviet intentions. An 
interesting observation is that US/Soviet and alliance 
relations parallel each other through 1975, then run counter 
through 1979 (see Figure 2). This suggests both West 
European confusion over U.S. policy and U.S. confusion over 
alliance policy after 1975. It also suggests that the 
detente in US/Soviet relations declined as alliance unity 
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became strained by West European perceptions of abandonment. 
In addition, whereas it was West European/Soviet relations 
that ran counter to US/Soviet and alliance relations from 
1969 to 1974, from 1975 through 1979 alliance relations 
generally ran counter to US/Soviet and West European/Soviet 
relations (see Figure 2). While US/Soviet relations turned 
toward confrontation, both sides' domestic policies held to 
a desire for a SALT II treaty. Western Europe was then 
experiencing a period of confusion. Security perceptions of 
entrapment (that arms control efforts were giving way to 
confrontation) were mixed with perceptions of abandonment 
(that a SALT II treaty would constrain or remove the U.S. 
commitment to Europe). Alliance unity was supported both by 
US/Soviet cooperation in arms control negotiations 
(flexibility and compromise) and US/Soviet confrontation 
(impasse in arms control due to uncompromising positions in 
questions regarding European security). Consequently, 
alliance relations turned downward following Schmidt's 
speech criticizing SALT II for failing to address European 
concerns, and following the signing of SALT II. 
Both U.S. and Soviet domestic policies favored the 
signing of SALT II, but not enough in the United States for 
ratification. The environment in which SALT II was 
negotiated was one of growing confrontation in US/Soviet and 
West European/Soviet relations, and confusion in alliance 
relations. The alliance called for new arms control 
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negotiations to address concerns of entrapment, then called 
for reassurance from the Unites States to address concerns 
of abandonment. 
If detente was a major test of alliance unity, so too 
detente was a test for arms control. Whereas changes in 
NATO security perceptions prompted a re-evaluation of 
detente, the success of SALT II likewise succumbed to the 
call for alliance unity. 
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commitment to European defense. West Europeans felt that 
U.S. missiles might not have to be deployed whereas the 
United States was becoming more committed to deployment and 
more reluctant toward arms control. 
CHAPTER IV 
INF/START 
THE ISSUES OF INF/START 
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) arms control 
negotiations were born out of SALT. But they marked a new 
chapter in US/Soviet arms control. For the most part, both 
the INF and START talks were conditioned by a pre-set 
deadline. The 1979 NATO "dual track" decision had dictated 
the end of 1983 as the date to begin deployment of Pershing 
and cruise missiles in Western Europe. 1 From the outset the 
INF component of the negotiations took priority, with the 
success of START relying on positive results in INF. START, 
as it now appears, never had a chance as it succumbed to the 
same fate as INF in 1983. 
Unlike SALT, theater nuclear forces and strategic 
forces were divided into separate forums. Though this arms 
control regime is largely associated with the Reagan 
administration, the INF talks actually began just prior to 
Reagan's election in 1980. The fundamental issues on which 
those talks would be based were actually a product of what 
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SALT succeeded or failed to do. The START negotiations, on 
the other hand, did not begin until the summer of 1982. 
INF 
The first round of INF took place in Geneva and was 
primarily an introductory meeting. The Soviets, for the 
most part, came to listen while the United States presented 
guidelines based on the Integrated Defense Document (IDD), a 
NATO communique issued in December 1979. 2 The primary task 
of the U.S. delegation was not so much to deal with those 
gray area weapons that had been so difficult in SALT, but to 
respond to the recent deployments of Soviet intermediate-
range missiles. 
The Soviet position, once those missiles were 
installed, was that a balance had been achieved in theater 
nuclear forces. The U.S. position, however, saw INF as the 
necessary forum in which to redress the imbalance caused by 
the Soviet deployments. In the first round of talks, 
therefore, the United States was already looking to at least 
a partial deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe. 
The purpose of the negotiation side of the "dual 
track" decision was to compliment partial deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles by offering a reduction in 
the number of missiles deployed in exchange for a reduction 
in the number of Soviet SS-20s. What this meant was that 
the United States was treating the December 1983 deadline 
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for deployment as if the missiles were already in place. 
The bargaining chip was the promise, or threat, to deploy 
new missiles rather than to remove existing weapons. 
Ideally, of course, it was hoped that negotiations would 
preclude new deployments in Western Europe. This was the 
idea behind the IDD decision. Although an anti-arms control 
attitude characterized the Reagan administration, a 
commitment was made to the "dual track" decision soon after 
Reagan took office. 3 
The Reagan administration, however, did not actually 
begin formal negotiations on INF until late 1981. During an 
NSC meeting on 12 November the decision was made to base the 
U.S. negotiating position on the lowest possible equal 
ceilings in intermediate-range weapons, preferably zero. 4 
On November 18th President Reagan officially announced the 
"zero option" in a National Press Club speech.~ The 
projected deployment of NATO missiles would be cancelled in 
exchange for the dismantling of all Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, 
and SS-5s. 
The Soviet position, however, was quite different. 
Since they claimed that a balance existed since 1979, any 
reduction or limitation of forces must include weapons 
already deployed, namely British and French forces, and U.S. 
forward-based systems in Europe. The Soviets also called 
for a complete moratorium on intermediate-range missile 
deployments until a treaty could be concluded. Total ''zero" 
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for the Soviet Union was possible as long as it meant moving 
closer to making Europe a nuclear free zone. And, if not a 
complete removal of nuclear forces, then a limit should be 
placed on all those weapons over one thousand kilometers in 
range. Such a limit was not without significance, as it 
would most have affected U.S. forward-based systems and U.S. 
forces outside Europe but part of NATO defense. 
Both the U.S. and the Soviet positions were far from 
any common grounds for agreement. The problem was that both 
sides had totally different ideas of the military balance in 
Europe, and that they adhered to different measurements of 
that balance. 6 The Soviets insisted on counting British and 
French systems while disregarding East bloc systems outside 
Europe (i.e., weapons in European Russia). The United 
States disregarded British and French systems and counted 
all Soviet systems in Eastern Europe. 
The Soviets counted U.S. aircraft carriers in the 
Mediterranean and the North Atlantic when considering the 
potential range of aircraft. Yet they disregarded their own 
Badger, Blinder, and Backfire bombers stationed outside 
European Russia, but having the capability to strike Western 
Europe. The Soviets also chose to count Launchers rather 
than warheads, disregarding the three warhead capability, 
and the mobility of the SS-20. The launcher's reloading 
capability also gave the SS-20 a second-strike potential, 
another qualitative factor not surprisingly missing from 
their count. 
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Not surprisingly too was the Soviet goal to prevent 
the planned NATO deployment. In Geneva for the second round 
of talks (the first under the Reagan administration), U.S. 
delegation leader Paul Nitze laid out the rationale for the 
zero option, but provided no real details of a treaty. The 
Soviet team came to reiterate Brezhnev's proposal, a four 
point plan which included an immediate moratorium on medium-
range (l,000-5,500 km.) weapons in Europe, negotiations 
toward reductions in those weapons, eventual reduction to 
zero of all medium-range weapons, and eventual reduction to 
zero of all short-range and tactical nuclear weapons. 
Included in this plan was a document on how this proposal 
was to be implemented. European forces (Including the 
British and French) only would be counted. The United 
States, on the other hand, called for global ceilings, 
covering Soviet missiles in Asia that could be re-deployed 
if need be in Western Russia, or vice versa. With very 
little to agree on, negotiations were recessed in time for 
Christmas. 
Returning to Geneva in February 1982, the U.S. team 
presented a draft treaty based on the zero option. Nitze's 
counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, tabled a document entitled 
"Statement of Intentions,'' the essence of which stated that 
the negotiations should produce an agreement that would 
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follow the Soviet version of the zero option--zero Pershing 
II and cruise missiles. It also reiterated their 
willingness to reduce to zero, matching only British and 
French systems. Each side rejected the other's proposals. 
The fourth round of talks began in May 1982 with 
neither side moving from their previous positions. The 
Soviets presented a draft treaty of their own, although it 
merely added a few details to their Statement of Intentions 
proposal. They did indicate some flexibility on including 
SS-20s deployed east of the Urals in a treaty. The 
inclusion of these missiles, however, had to be precluded by 
a moratorium on further deployments, the key requirement of 
the Soviet position. This brought the negotiations back to 
the main obstacle, the deployment of Pershing and cruise 
missiles in Europe. By the summer of 1982, therefore, the 
talks had reached an impasse. 
At the negotiating table the Soviets had been hinting 
for some time that they would pull out of the talks if the 
United States proceeded with the 1983 deployment schedule. 
They had also hinted at possible counter-measures such as 
new deployments of their own. Indeed, early in 1984 such 
counter-measures were reported. 7 
Acting on his own, and motivated by political 
pressures to break the impasse and reach an agreement before 
the deployment date, chief U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze 
attempted a compromise solution. 8 During the summer of 1982 
103 
he decided to discuss such a solution one on one with his 
counterpart, Kvitsinsky. The proposed solution, the "walk 
in the woods," as it came to be called, was an agreed-upon 
compromise which each ambassador would present to their 
respective governments. Calling it a "joint exploratory 
package," such an agreement would have compromised several 
key issues. 
The Soviets would have allowed new U.S. weapons in 
Europe. The Pershings would not be deployed but cruise 
missiles would be acceptable. The Soviets would also give 
up their insistence for compensation if British and French 
forces were not included, as had been their position in 
SALT. Soviet plans for their own cruise missiles would also 
be scrapped. The United States would sacrifice deployment 
of the Pershing II (The Soviets were more adamant about 
preventing deployment of the cruise). A freeze on Soviet 
SS-20s east of the Urals would also lend assurance to Japan, 
Korea, and China, that their own security wasn't being 
sacrificed by an INF treaty. 
The "walk in the woods" solution would have meant a 
major breakthrough in INF so long as both governments saw 
fit to pursue it. Unfortunately, it was rejected by both 
governments and instead became a major political propaganda 
issue. The unofficial agreement to the plan was 
subsequently denied by Kvitsinsky. According to him, 
Nitze's claim that the proposal was an "agreed-upon" deal, 
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was aimed only to demonstrate some progress in the 
negotiations. 9 Nitze, on the other hand, claimed that the 
proposal was based on Soviet willingness to drop the 
question of including British and french forces. According 
to Nitze, the Soviets wanted to make it appear that all the 
initiative for the proposal came from Nitze alone, and then 
was rejected by the Reagan administration. Accordingly, the 
Soviets were attempting to show West European governments 
that breakdown in negotiations was the fault of U.S. 
inflexibility.to 
Although the talks resumed in Geneva in the fall of 
1982, continuing through 1983, nothing was accomplished. 
Both sides were adamant in their positions. Even where 
there was slight movement, the goals remained the same. It 
became clear that the Reagan administration was not willing 
to abandon any part of the scheduled deployment, whereas the 
Soviets were not about to sanction any deployment 
whatsoever. Following the death of Brezhnev, his successor, 
Yuri Andropov, merely reiterated the Soviet position. He 
offered to match British and French forces with reductions 
of Soviet medium-range missiles. The United States, 
however, would have to abandon its NATO deployments. 11 
The United States, for its part, arrived at what was 
known as the ''Interim Solution." Until an understanding 
could be reached as to how to achieve a reduction to zero, 
the present balance must be redressed by moving ahead with 
new deployments. The actual number of missiles to be 
deployed, however, was claimed to be still negotiable. 
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In reality, this "solution" marked a major step away 
from the "dual track" decision which sought to preclude new 
missile deployments with arms control. Now, the 
administration was putting deployment ahead of any 
reductions. The "solution" also demonstrated the 
administration's expectations that the Soviets would 
continue negotiating once deployments began, or that a 
Soviet walkout would justify deployments. This zero-plus 
proposal, not surprisingly, was quickly rejected by the 
Soviet Union. 
As the date for the delivery of the first Pershings 
drew nearer, negotiations reached a breaking point. The 
crisis over the downing of a South Korean airliner on 2 
September 1983 merely added to the already frustrated 
relations between the two countries. On 28 September 1983 
Andropov expressed Soviet frustration with the arms talks 
and the pointlessness of their continuation. 12 On November 
23rd, as the first Pershings arrived in West Germany, the 
Soviet delegation broke off negotiations. No date was set 
for their resumption. 
START 
The negotiations of START, like INF, were part of a 
U.S. solution to redress a perceived imbalance; in theater 
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weapons, brought about by the buildup of Soviet SS-20s 
during the 1970s and, in strategic forces by the deployment 
of new Soviet ICBMs, in particular, the SS-18, a ten-
warhead, landbased, "monster MIRV." And, as in INF, both 
sides' positions stemmed from the same basic assumptions. 
According to prevailing U.S. policy, SALT II had sanctioned 
an imbalance in nuclear forces in favor of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet position, as stated by Gromyko, was that, "we 
proceed from the assumption that everything was balanced out 
in the SALT II treaty." 13 Consequently, the goals of both 
sides in INF paralleled those in START. The United States 
sought deployment of new weapons systems in exchange for a 
reduction or limitation on existing Soviet systems. The 
fate of START was linked to that of INF as well since the 
Soviet goal in START was to prevent new American 
deployments, strategic or theater. Indeed, the Soviets had 
made it clear that a START treaty must be precluded by the 
cancellation of Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles. 
The long-awaited airing of Reagan's START proposal 
came on 9 May 1982 in a speech at Eureka College.1 4 Reagan 
spoke in vague, general terms about the proposal, the main 
essence of which was to achieve reductions in Soviet 
missiles, most importantly the Soviet "heavy" SS-18. The 
United States, for its part, would pursue a modernization of 
its own forces; the MX, B-1 and Stealth Bombers, cruise 
missiles, and Trident II. The Soviet Union was quick to 
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reject the proposal, ired by the fact that Reagan was 
focusing limitations on Soviet land-based missiles, the 
backbone of their strategic forces. The United States, they 
claimed, had in effect agreed to leave those missiles alone 
at Vladivostok in 1974. They also claimed that the United 
States was unwilling to sacrifice new weapons systems, such 
as the MX, in exchange for Soviet reductions. 
Shortly after the Eureka speech, Brezhnev answered 
with his own proposal; a freeze on the production, testing, 
and deployment of both sides' strategic systems. This 
proposal would have not only frozen the quantity of the 
Soviet missiles that Reagan wanted reduced, but would have 
also blocked the United States from any further development 
of the Stealth, MX, Trident II, and cruise missiles. 
By autumn 1982 when START negotiators finally met in 
Geneva, both sides' positions were firmly set, and far 
apart. The Soviet team elaborated on Brezhnev's freeze 
proposal. They also reiterated Gromyko's warning in June 
1982, that if the United States continued to pursue the 
issue of Soviet "heavies," the Soviet Union would be forced 
to reconsider the issue of American forward-based systems in 
Europe. 1 ~ Gromyko's warning was transformed into a proposal 
by the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Called the "reduction 
proposal," its main feature was a lower SALT II ceiling on 
total delivery vehicles (from 2250 to 1800) in exchange for 
a U.S. guarantee of no additional deployments of FBS. Thus, 
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from the outset, START was inextricably linked with INF. 
The Soviets were making it perfectly clear that no progress 
in strategic arms reduction was possible as long as the 
United States proceeded with additional INF deployments. 
Also included in the "reduction proposal" was a new 
ban on all long-range cruise missiles. The SALT II 
Protocol, which had banned long-range sea and ground-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and GLCMs), but allowed air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs}, had since expired. The 
United States was thus being asked to scrap its ALCM 
program. 
Equally unacceptable to the Soviets was an American 
proposal designed specifically to reduce the number of 
Soviet "heavies," and the total number of land-based 
missiles in general. The proposal called for a two-phase 
reduction. The first phase limited the total number of 
ballistic warheads, with a subceiling on those based on 
land. The second phase established a low limit on ballistic 
throw-weight. Another U.S. proposal called for an 
''inventory limit" on undeveloped ICBMs. Whereas such a 
limit would deter only Soviet attempts to stockpile large 
numbers of extra ICBMs, it necessitated a verification 
arrangement to include on-site inspection of production and 
storage facilities, not to mention launch sites. The 
Soviets, though they agreed on the need for more stringent 
verification, were unwilling to accept such comprehensive 
verification measures. 
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By 1983 very little progress had been made in Geneva. 
The Soviets remained adamant in their position against the 
scheduled deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, and 
against allowing new U.S. strategic programs to proceed at 
the expense of their present missile systems. Meanwhile, 
the Reagan administration was trying to steer a course of 
strategic buildup through domestic pressures for a nuclear 
freeze. 16 
In March 1983 Reagan approached the nation, and the 
Soviets, with a proposal to develop a new strategy and 
technology based on defense weapons systems, one that would, 
II . give us the means of rendering . . . nuclear weapons 
impotent and obsolete." 17 Beside raising questions 
regarding the validity of strategic deterrence based on 
mutual assured destruction (MAD), the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) was immediately assailed by the Soviet 
Union for perpetuating a new arms race and abandoning the 
1972 ABM Treaty.is 
In part, to assuage Congress and the arms control 
lobby in Washington, and in order to avert cancellation of 
the MX, the Reagan administration in the fall of 1983, 
incorporated its "build-down" theory into START 
negotiations; a plan to retire older weapons at a faster 
pace than they are replaced. 19 
110 
With the additional proposal of "build-down" on the 
negotiating table, coupled with Reagan's newly proposed SDI 
program, the Soviets were likely confused by the 
administration's arms control policy. Was the "build-down" 
supposed to replace the previous U.S. position in START? 
How would SDI affect START negotiations? To the Soviets, 
the "build-down" concept left the U.S. position in START as 
"vague, obscure, and unclear. 0 20 
The added confusion in START, however, seemed to 
matter very little by that time. START was already dead as 
the first Pershing !Is were delivered to West Germany. On 8 
December 1983, two weeks after the INF talks were cancelled, 
the Soviets walked out of the strategic arms talks without a 
resumption date. 
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE 
The Reagan Administration 
If hopes for the success of arms control as a viable 
foreign policy tool were diminished in late 1979 when 
President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from further 
Senate consideration, those hopes were further dashed by the 
election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980. All 
aspects of the new administration signaled an impending 
demotion of arms control in U.S. foreign policy and the 
promotion of an all-out effort to restore the military, and 
political superiority of a past era. 
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In the military realm, this effort was based on the 
new administration's perspective that the nuclear balance 
had shifted decisively in favor of the Soviet Union. 
Blaming the "negotiability" of arms control, SALT in 
particular, Reagan embarked on a massive re-arming 
program. 2 1 Such a program was also seen as the key to 
restoring political unity to NATO. Western Europe, as the 
new administration assumed, would regain the confidence in 
American leadership that it had lost during the Carter era. 
Personal Attitudes 
Within the domestic milieu of the Reagan 
administration, the factors which contributed most to an 
anti-arms control policy and, at least the initial success 
in support of that policy, can be accredited to Ronald 
Reagan himself, his strong conservative ideological views, 
the extent to which his decisions were based on ideology 
rather than thoughtful analysis, and his ability as a 
communicator. 
Backed by a seasoned career in public speaking, as 
sportscaster, trade union activist, spokesman for General 
Electric, actor, and finally as Governor of California, 
Ronald Reagan took his conservative views on the campaign 
trail as a candidate with an "attractive personality and 
style as political performer. 11 22 Less government regulation 
of the free market, decentralization of federal government, 
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lower taxes, and a tougher Soviet policy were the mainstay 
of his conservative platform. 
Reagan's foreign policy was not surprising given his 
earlier record as a candidate for President. He campaigned 
against SALT and detente in 1976 on the premise that the 
Soviets were the only ones to benefit from it. During the 
1980 campaign he came out in favor of a naval blockade of 
Cuba in order to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan. He 
also advocated the mining of Iranian ports in order to gain 
the release of U.S. hostages. Reagan's views, however, 
should not be seen as representing a casual approach to the 
use of force, as Barnet claims, as much as they should be 
seen as reflecting the attitudes of a man whose style and 
image was shaped by a "get tough" rhetoric, simplistic 
ideals, and superficiality.2a 
It appears that Ronald Reagan knew and cared little 
about strategy and concerned himself strictly with 
generalities. He was a speechmaker, not a policymaker. As 
Greenstein notes, Reagan's strong suit was dealing with 
general themes rather than the specifics of issues. 
As a rhetorician who pref erred anecdote to analysis 
he could be sold on policies or even political 
strategies without exploring their implications. 24 
Participation 
In matters of arms control, Reagan displayed no 
realistic comprehension of the issues. His knowledge and 
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participation merely reinforced the ideological extreme and 
simplicity of his world view. As Talbott notes, during pre-
zero option NSC meetings, Reagan's attention would be lost 
as he began to doodle. "It was common . during long 
meetings on subjects about which he was less than passionate 
"2 :5 
Examples of Reagan's participation in decisionmaking 
in arms control are numerous. Talbott reveals how, through 
long and highly technical debates over INF and START, Reagan 
formulated his own simplistic ideas. 
Cruise missiles were 'good' because they were, by 
their nature, confined to retaliatory, second-strike 
missions; ballistic missiles were 'bad' because they 
were capable of preemptive, aggressive, first-strike 
missions.2 6 
The "walk in the woods" proposal, which allowed the 
Soviets to retain a lesser number of ballistic missiles, 
countered only by U.S. cruise missiles was, on the other 
hand, rejected by Reagan. In his mind, the United States 
would have to rely on "slow-flyers" (cruise missiles) in 
order to counter the Soviet "fast-flyers" (SS-20s) .2 1 
In an interview with Time Magazine in October 1983 
Reagan acknowledged that as recently as 1982 he did not 
realize that the bulk of Soviet nuclear forces were made up 
of large land-based missiles. Nobody, he explained, had 
ever brought that up before.2 8 
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Scope of Authority 
Aside from Reagan's personal attitudes, the initial 
success of his anti-arms control policy must also be 
accredited to a wide scope of authority. Reagan's election 
victory, which included ninety percent of the electoral vote 
(489 to 49) , 29 the first Republican control of the Senate 
since 1954, and a thirty-three seat Republican gain in the 
House, 30 provided Reagan with a perceived, if not real 
mandate for his policies. 
Whether Reagan's conservative ideology was any 
indication of the popular attitude that voted him into 
office, it was his fine-tuned ability to communicate and 
influence, coupled with surrounding himself with other 
staunch conservatives, that ensured that his policies would 
prevail over more moderate voices from within both political 
parties. Although the Reagan administrative style could be 
called more of a cabinet government, given the President's 
reliance on his advisors for policy specifics and 
implementation, Reagan always reserved the final word on 
major issues for himself, which he then made public via 
emotional speeches or aggrandized press conferences. Though 
his decisions were of ten based on his own ideological 
outlook and simplistic views, his authority was generally 
undisputed. Whereas the same can hold true of any 
administration, it is a credit to Reagan's strong 
personality that advisors often were inclined to "tailor 
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their recommendations to fit his presumed views and 
biases. n31 
There is no question that the political leadership 
characteristics of the Reagan administration were a major 
contributor to the impasse in INF and START. From the 
outset, the U.S. position was one designed primarily to cast 
the image of serious negotiating while moving forward with 
the re-arming programs that Reagan had espoused. The basis 
of the zero option was more than an intentionally 
unacceptable proposal. It was part and parcel of the anti-
soviet, anti-communist ideology that characterized the 
Reagan administration. If the NATO "dual track'' decision 
was partly designed to re-establish whatever momentum in 
arms control that SALT had once achieved, it most surely, 
too, became the ideal vehicle for the Reagan administration 
to achieve new missile deployments in Western Europe. 
Transition in Soviet Leadership 
Soviet behavior in INF and START was beset by internal 
problems, both economic and political. Expectations of 
improved economic performance were not realized. The 
national income annual growth rate was about 3 percent in 
1982 as compared to over 9 percent in 1964. 32 Industrial 
production fell from 7.3 percent in 1964 to 2.9 percent in 
1982. 33 In addition, poor agricultural harvests in 1979 and 
1980, labor shortages, and increased competition for 
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resource allocation between heavy and light industry put 
further demands on the leadership for reforms. Furthermore, 
the failure of Brezhnev's detente policy to expand trade and 
credit with the West, compounded the severity of the 
economic situation. 
The failure of Brezhnev's economic and detente 
policies, the success of which was the mainstay of 
Brezhnev's leadership credibility, created a wider division 
among the top leadership over policy direction. As the 
Strodes note, the domestic coalition that had supported 
detente in 1970, dichotomized by "unilateralists'' and 
"diplomatists," was now split by the failure of detente.3 4 
That coalition was further weakened by the issue of 
leadership succession. Brezhnev's sustained poor health and 
increasing inability to perform in an official capacity 
prompted competition and political positioning within the 
Party ranks. The Soviet leadership, faced with the 
demanding problems of the economy and detente, was further 
detained from rebuilding any policy consensus by the ensuing 
struggle for succession. As the Strodes concede, however, 
leaders vying for position, " ... may adopt positions for 
purely tactical reasons," 3 ~ Since the distinction between 
differing policy perspectives becomes "blurred" during 
periods of succession, the use of dichotomies in the 
analysis of Soviet politics may not be appropriate.3 6 
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Soviet Policy in INF/START 
Soviet policy during the early 1980s, therefore, may 
be considered a transitional period, marked by uncertainty, 
confusion, and an uncompromising, wait and see attitude in 
arms control. As Redlin has observed, a climate of 
succession politics, marked by "contention" and "stalemate," 
is not conducive to new initiatives in Soviet national 
security policy. 3 7 Thus, he explains, this period of arms 
control was one of "meager accomplishment" during Brezhnev's 
last years, and of "continuity in substance and strategy" 
with Brezhnev's policies during Andropov's term as General 
Secretary. 3 a 
Whereas some observers of Soviet politics may be more 
willing to credit Andropov with a new aggressiveness in 
foreign policy, citing, for example, his "peace offensive" 
in Western Europe, 39 events and actions indicate a growing 
reluctance by Brezhnev and Andropov to defend the priority 
of arms control as they had done in the 1970s. In an 
October 1982 speech Brezhnev made no mention of INF and 
START but called for top priority in military funding. 40 
Speeches by other Politburo members also displayed a 
negative view toward arms control. 4 1 Furthermore, although 
Andropov has been characterized as "pro-detente," 42 
criticisms were voiced regarding the emphasis of cooperative 
diplomacy in Soviet security policy. 4 3 
Short of a complete reversal in policy, however, the 
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tendency toward the "unilateralist'' approach might be viewed 
more as a reassertion of the more traditional Soviet view of 
peaceful coexistence, with its explicit call for continued 
conflict between socialism and capitalism. In this view, 
Soviet policy did not give way to the views of a competing 
faction, but was merely a reaffirmation of the long-term 
socialist goals adhered to by all Party leaders. Detente, 
not unlike peaceful coexistence, was meant to constrain the 
West, not the Soviet Union. If it fails to do so, Soviet 
socialism must prevail by other, unilateral means. 
Soviet arms control proposals, the goals of which were 
to block NATO missile deployments and American strategic 
arms programs, were designed to retain the favorable 
correlation of forces achieved in the 1970s. But they also 
marked a change in the means to achieve these goals. Rather 
than constraining Western military buildup through treaty 
compromises and luring the West into a sense of relaxed 
tension, Andropov sought to unilaterally move ahead with his 
own military buildup while rhetorically influencing public 
opinion in the West with the idea that it was the United 
States that was not serious about arms control. 
Insofar as Soviet perceptions of the Reagan 
administration were correct, Soviet policy must also be seen 
as reacting to U.S. policy. The Soviet walkout of INF in 
December 1983 demonstrated their frustration in negotiating 
with the Reagan administration. Beyond this, the walkout 
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may also be seen as an indication that, within the top 
leadership, a reaffirmation of policy consensus had already 
emerged which in turn provided the political conditions 
allowing Andropov to drop arms control altogether. 
Nevertheless, the succession issue, which remained at 
the forefront of Soviet politics due to Andropov's own 
declining health and lasting through the transitional period 
of Chernenko, sustained an unstable power arrangement in the 
Kremlin, thereby constraining whatever initiatives Soviet 
leaders may have wished to advance.4 4 
The fate of INF and START, therefore, was doomed as 
both the Soviet and American political leader 
characteristics proved unfavorable to arms control. 
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES 
Of any arms control regime thus far, perhaps INF/Start 
demonstrates the best case of subsystem influence on U.S. 
foreign policy. Arguments that hold the Reagan 
administration's confrontational and unilateral style of 
foreign policy responsible for the impasse in arms control 
negotiations are only valid to the extent that foreign 
policy failed to recognize and accommodate the constraints 
of the subsystem. The Reagan "challenge" to restore 
American power through military, political, and economic 
domination rather than accommodation went a long way in 
aggravating adversary and alliance relations alike. But it 
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did not fundamentally alter them. On the contrary, it was 
Reagan's policies that were forced to adapt as his attempt 
to control the environment was challenged by recent changes 
within the subsystem itself. As Kenneth Oye has keenly 
observed, "Ironically, the evolution of Reagan 
administration foreign policy may appear, in retrospect, as 
a textbook example of how the international environment 
shapes foreign policy." 4 ~ 
Changed Security Perceptions 
The events and outcome of INF/START must therefore be 
linked to the transformation of the subsystem relationships. 
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached a new low as the 1980s began (see Appendix Table XV 
and Figure 2). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
developing crisis in Poland, and new missile deployments, 
all but completely dismantled the detente established a 
decade earlier. 
Relations between the United States and Western Europe 
also worsened as West European security concerns intensified 
(see Appendix Table XV). At one extreme allied fears were 
raised by a US/Soviet agreement (SALT II) which in their 
view had been made at the expense of European security. At 
the other extreme they feared the breakdown of detente and a 
return to cold war relations between the superpowers. 
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The allies wanted reassurance from the United States 
that it would not allow the American nuclear deterrent to 
become decoupled from European deterrence. At the same time 
they sought reassurance from the United States that serious 
efforts to promote better East/West relations would not be 
lost to a renewed, sustained arms race. Alarmed by 
President Carter's about-face on his decision to provide 
allied countries with the neutron bomb, West European 
governments called upon the United States to deploy new 
missiles for NATO's deterrent. At the same time they called 
for new arms control negotiations as a way to promote a 
return to detente and hopefully to preclude new missile 
deployments. 
This was the essence of the 1979 NATO Integrated 
Decision Document (IDD), otherwise known as the ''dual track" 
decision. The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles 
was scheduled to begin in December 1983 unless arms control 
negotiations were successful in averting it. 
Caught between the need to check the deployment of a 
new generation of Soviet theater missiles (SS-20s) and the 
need to sustain an atmosphere of favorable East/West 
relations, West European governments walked a fine political 
line between detente and deterrence. Consequently, West 
European/Soviet relations in the latter 1970s maintained a 
precariously balanced relationship as the US/Soviet detente 
faltered (see Appendix Tables X-XIII), then worsened as 
US/Soviet relations chilled during the early 1980s (see 
Appendix Table XIV) . 
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Domestic pressures mounted as the fate of West 
European governments rested on the question of European 
security. Opposition parties in Britain, West Germany, 
Italy, and the intransigence of Belgium and the Netherlands, 
all scheduled to receive a share of the missile 
deployments, 46 threatened the survival of their pro-NATO 
governments. In order to strengthen themselves, and NATO, 
pressure had to be put on the United States and the Soviet 
Union to negotiate an agreement that reduced the risk of war 
in Europe. 
U.S. and Soviet Reaction 
In order to strengthen NATO unity it was necessary for 
the United States to focus on the needs of its allies. And, 
in order to divide the alliance, the Soviet Union would have 
to attempt to sway European public opinion, playing the 
Atlantic partners off one another by showing a willingness 
to negotiate. Consequently, the direction that US/Soviet 
relations would take, and that INF/START would follow, was 
largely dependent upon the political decisions of West 
European governments and the degree to which the two 
superpowers could elicit West European support for their own 
policy goals. To be sure, in INF/START Western Europe 
clearly had become a negotiating party without formal 
negotiating status. The "dual track" decision had 
set the scene for a situation in which the Europeans 
could more easily push the U.S. around--and the 
Soviet Union could more easily push the Europeans 
around. 47 
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Having committed to the NATO dual track decision, the 
United States had made the deployment of a nuclear weapons 
program "dependent on prior allied consent" and a commitment 
to arms control a pre-condition to deployment. 4 8 For 
President Reagan, with his antipathy toward arms control, 
the decision to back away from the 1979 decision would have 
been seen as a severe breach of faith between alliance 
partners, something for which he had criticized Jimmy 
Carter. It also would have given the Soviet Union, at no 
cost to them, a clear political victory over the West. For 
its own part, the United States would have to hold its 
allies to the deployment track while they, in turn, would 
have to hold the Reagan administration to arms control 
negotiations. 
On the other hand, the "dual track" decision provided 
the Soviet Union with the unique opportunity to gain "a 
Soviet veto over any kind of deployment and the first step 
toward . neutralization" of Western Europe. 49 In the 
same vein, as Talbott asserts, 
If the Soviets played the allies off against each 
other, fanned the hopes and fears of the West 
European peace movement, and exploited transatlantic 
tensions skillfully, they stood to win a double 
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prize, a halt to a threatening military program, and new 
political discord within NAT0.~ 0 
Both sides, therefore, were sufficiently motivated to 
participate in arms control negotiations, but not within the 
framework of SALT. The Reagan administration had been 
opposed to the treaty on the claim that it froze the nuclear 
balance in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, too, had 
reason not to insist on a SALT framework. SALT II had been 
facilitated by agreeing not to include the American forward-
based systems as well as British and French systems. If the 
Soviets were to successfully block the deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles, SALT II, for obvious 
reasons, could not be allowed to establish such a precedent 
for any new treaty. 
The formal opening of INF negotiations did not take 
place until November 1981, one year after Reagan was elected 
President. The delay is certainly no surprise given the 
anti-arms control bias of his campaign. Reagan did, 
however, commit to arms control on the basis of the "dual 
track" decision in April 1981. Only after West European 
prodding and Soviet criticism did Reagan finally agree to 
begin discussions in Geneva. 
The interim, though, was not wasted time as both sides 
began maneuvering for political position. Aimed both at 
building domestic support for defense programs and allied 
support for the scheduled missile deployments, Reagan sought 
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to promote the Soviet Union as the root of all evil in the 
world. He vowed that by regaining superiority the West 
would transcend and dismiss communism as a "sad, bizarre 
chapter in human history."~ 1 He renewed criticism of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan warning that any military action on 
their part against Poland would have "the gravest 
consequences."~2 
The Soviet Union, in the meantime, launched an all out 
peace campaign directed primarily at Western Europe in order 
to portray themselves as a peace-loving nation willing to 
compromise in the spirit of detente.~ 3 In keeping with that 
line, Brezhnev initiated a proposal to begin discussions for 
reducing tensions between the superpowers. 
West European Reaction 
Alliance relations had further deteriorated by 
November. At a time when West European governments were 
trying to calm rising waves of public protest against higher 
defense spending and more nuclear weapons on their soil, the 
United States was pushing them to increase their individual 
contributions toward NATO defense. Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger told West Europeans, "The American people may not 
wish to bear the burden of necessary defense expenditures if 
they think some are doing less as we do more."~ 4 During 
October and November demonstrations of over one million 
peace marchers gathered in West European capitals, including 
250,000 protesters in Bonn,ee and 300,000 in Brussels. 06 
Over three million marchers were expected to take part in 
planned demonstrations during "action week" in October.e 7 
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The European peace movement turned more anti-American 
than anti-Soviet, particularly following a remark by 
President Reagan that he "could see where you could have an 
exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field 
without it bringing either one of the major powers to 
pushing the button.••ea West Europeans were outraged by the 
President's admission of a contingency plan for limited 
nuclear war in Europe, but it seemed to attest to all their 
suspicions about Ronald Reagan. All the Soviet Union had to 
do was to sit back and empathize with European frustration. 
West European public opinion appeared to be on the Soviets' 
side. 
The Issue of Deployment 
From the beginning to end, INF/START was a forum, not 
for achieving real arms limitations or reductions, but for 
advancing political objectives. There were some within the 
Reagan administration who did not advocate earnest 
negotiations toward real arms reductions. But, it seems, to 
achieve real arms control in the early 1980s was, at best, 
wishful thinking. Spurgeon Keeny, who was deputy director 
at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) at the 
time of the "dual track" decision, admits that the 
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commitment to arms control was solely to promote new missile 
deployments rather than real missile reductions: 
most people ... looked on this as a political 
necessity to get NATO acceptance of the deployment, 
rather than something where the arms control process 
had a serious chance of success.~ 9 
Deployment was the real issue. Since neither the 
Pershing II nor the cruise missile would be ready for 
deployment until December 1983, INF/START would be 
guaranteed a life span of at least two years, unless of 
course the United States were to renege on its commitment to 
deployment, or the Soviet Union either gave up its attempt 
to prevent deployment or agreed to reduce the number of its 
SS-20s. The Soviets, though, had little incentive to 
concede their position since they had two years in which to 
persuade West Europeans that deployment was not in their 
best interests. The Soviets also were quite aware, as 
Talbott explains, that the longer they "could get the West 
Europeans to procrastinate, the less bargaining leverage the 
U.S. would have in the negotiations."60 
The next chapter in arms control promised to be little 
more than an exchange of proposals, based not on their 
negotiability, but intended for West European consumption. 
While American negotiators hammered out the virtues of the 
"zero option,'' their Soviet counterparts espoused Brezhnev's 
moratorium on further deployments pending a treaty. In 
addition, they presented their own version of "zero" which 
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meant establishing Europe as a nuclear free zone. If total 
zero was unacceptable to the United States, then, the 
Soviets suggested, a four point plan designed to achieve 
reductions in medium-range systems after a moratorium was in 
effect, followed by the eventual elimination of all nuclear 
weapons from Europe. 
In order to promote his proposals and timed to take 
advantage of public demonstrations, Brezhnev personally 
travelled to Bonn in November 1981. There he offered to 
take the first step by unilaterally eliminating hundreds of 
Soviet missiles. 6 1 The missiles he spoke of, however, were 
the older SS-4s and SS-5s which the SS-20s were to replace 
anyway. Nevertheless, Brezhnev's proposal struck a popular 
note among West Europeans. And, although West European 
governments continued to stand by the deployment decision, 
the Soviet peace campaign made it difficult for allied 
governments to maintain a consensus in favor of deployment. 
Alliance Relations 
The more West European governments were pressured, the 
more that pressure was re-directed at the United States to 
break the arms control impasse and find some formula for 
compromise. Such was the political backdrop leading to the 
''walk in the woods" solution. The significance of this 
initiative was that, where it might have been used to dispel 
West European concerns that no progress was being made 
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toward an agreement, in fact it was not. Both sides 
rejected the plan. The United States even wanted to 
withhold the fact that a Nitze-Kvitsinsky arrangement ever 
took place. The Reagan administration feared that allied 
consultation and the possibility of allied approval might 
force the United States to adopt the plan as a basis for 
agreement. 
European suspicions were renewed that any attempt at 
progress in arms control by the United States was taking a 
back seat to nothing less than full deployment of the 572 
Pershing and cruise missiles. What should have been clear, 
and perhaps it was, was that the U.S. commitment to 
deployment, based on the alliance call for stronger NATO 
leadership and solidarity, as defined by the 1979 NATO 
decision, would essentially prevent any serious arms 
agreement from being achieved. This was also evident in one 
of the administration's main arguments against a nuclear 
freeze. 
A freeze would cast serious doubt on American 
leadership of the NATO alliance .... A freeze now, 
would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the 
United States to withdraw from this joint allied 
undertaking.62 
A continuation of arms control dialogue between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, however, was also a 
necessary part of that commitment to alliance solidarity, at 
least until those governments, designated as recipients of 
deployment, formally accepted the new missiles. The Soviet 
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Union, meanwhile, took the opportunity to woo Western Europe 
away from deployment as strained alliance relations were 
further tested. 
Anti-nuclear demonstrations continued in Europe. The 
nuclear freeze movement in the United States gained 
legislative sponsorship in Congress. Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig resigned. 63 Arguments were renewed 
advocating a no first-use nuclear strategy for NAT0. 64 By 
1981 US/West European relations were at the lowest point in 
ten years (see Figure 2). Serious damage to alliance 
relations occurred in 1982 as the result of a controversy 
involving East/West trade policy. 6 ~ The United States was 
concerned that a decision by Britain, France, West Germany, 
and Italy to sell equipment to the Soviet Union for the 
construction of a pipeline to be used to supply gas to 
Western Europe would dangerously increase their dependency 
on the Soviet Union. 
The allies did not share this view. Only a small 
fraction of their total energy needs would be provided by 
the pipeline. The crisis developed, however, when the 
United States decided to invoke sanctions against American 
companies and their European subsidiaries involved in the 
pipeline deal. The allies saw this action as an 
infringement on their sovereignty and refused to reverse 
their decision. In order to prevent any permanent rift in 
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the alliance, the Reagan administration was forced to call 
off the sanctions only a few months later. 
The significance of the pipeline controversy was much 
more than a crisis in alliance solidarity. It underscored 
the basic differences between American and West European 
security policy. The United States sought to deter Soviet 
aggression by isolating the Soviet Union. The Europeans 
argued for greater economic interdependence between East and 
West. The carrot and the stick approach to Soviet policy 
divided alliance perceptions of security. Western Europe 
pressed the need for arms control while the United States 
pressed for deployment. 
Soviet Policy: Last Chance to Divide NATO on Deployment 
The Kremlin's strategy was to exploit these 
differences. Threats were made to walk out of arms control 
negotiations and to deploy new nuclear weapons if the NATO 
deployment proceeded. In December 1982 Yuri Andropov 
offered to reduce the number of medium-range missiles to 
match those of the British and French forces. 66 In January 
1983 the Soviets offered to negotiate a non-aggression pact 
with NATO. 
As the 1983 deployment date drew nearer it became more 
doubtful that the Soviets would be able to prevent or even 
delay deployment. The upcoming West German elections in 
March 1983 presented a last chance opportunity to turn the 
tide against deployment. If West German public opinion 
could be swayed enough in opposition, then perhaps Helmut 
Kohl's government would have to rely on a coalition more 
committed to arms control, or to some concessions on 
deployment. 
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Kohl's party was victorious, and in the aftermath of 
the election the United States did propose the "interim 
solution" that qualified only partial deployment until an 
agreement could be reached on a reduction to zero. This 
"zero plus" proposal was presented primarily to bolster 
Kohl's new government, while preparing the way for the 
arrival of the first shipment of Pershing IIs in West 
Germany. 67 
By fall 1983 the Soviets were dropping strong hints of 
discontinuing INF negotiations. 68 The September Korean 
airliner incident seriously damaged Western perceptions of 
peaceful Soviet intentions. 6 9 Alliance relations 
experienced a leveling off of tension in 1983 (see Figure 
2). As the first cruise missiles arrived in Britain in 
December 1983, the Soviets walked out of INF and START 
negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
By 1980 US/Soviet relations had reached the lowest 
level of cooperation thus far (see Figure 2). From a 
bilateral perspective, US/Soviet arms control negotiations 
had very little chance of convening, let alone succeeding 
with an arms control treaty. 
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The analysis of the Reagan administration concludes a 
definite anti-arms control posture. The analysis of the 
transition and confusion in Soviet politics supports the 
conclusion of minimal motivation for arms control 
negotiations. Since the two superpowers did enter into arms 
control negotiations, the motivation can only be understood 
by adding the subsystem perspective. 
The trilateral political environment of INF/START had 
been established by 1979. It had been decided that cruise 
and Pershing II missiles would be deployed in Western 
Europe, but would be coupled with arms control efforts. 
NATO's "dual track" decision and the zero-option position of 
the United States were not so much bargaining chip and 
leveraging tactics to gain Soviet concessions as they were 
reflections of NATO ambivalence in Western security policy. 
In this view, the "dual track'' decision was at once designed 
to calm West European fears of entrapment (in an atmosphere 
of growing perceptions of US/Soviet confrontation) , and to 
allay West European fears of abandonment (in response to 
West European perceptions of an increasing Soviet military 
threat) . 
INF/START was, therefore, a forum in which U.S. and 
Soviet arms control policy was largely set and played out 
according to two relationships; US/West European and West 
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European/Soviet. INF and START negotiations thus proceeded 
on the basis of U.S. policies that sought to promote 
alliance unity and Soviet policies that sought to promote 
alliance disunity. 
US/West European relations did level off with American 
reassurance that deployment would proceed, but the degree of 
unity remained low as negotiations stagnated toward a treaty 
that could preclude the deployment of cruise and Pershing 
IIs (see Figure 2). West European/Soviet relations bettered 
somewhat by 1983 (see Figure 2) due to some success by the 
Soviet Union to opportunize on West European entrapment 
concerns. 
The motivation to negotiate INF/START, however, was 
lost as the deployment half of the ''dual track" decision 
became a reality. The Soviets cancelled all arms talks in 
December 1983 and US/Soviet relations took a sharp turn 
downward (see Figure 2). US/Soviet relations and US/Soviet 
arms control were, therefore, most significantly the result 
of the subsystem environment in which the assumed behavior 
of the alliance/adversary model were played out. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 
By examining West European/US subsystem variables, in 
addition to domestic and bilateral processes, this study has 
demonstrated that US/Soviet arms control, including the 
motivation to negotiate, negotiating positions and the 
result of negotiations, is significantly affected by these 
subsystem relationships and is not entirely the outcome of a 
bilateral process involving only domestic political factors. 
Based on this study's analyses of SALT I, SALT II, and 
INF/START, the trilateral relationship of the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and Western Europe has had a definite 
impact on US/Soviet arms control. 
This study has also demonstrated that the behavior of 
the United States and the Soviet Union toward arms control 
(acting in accordance with the alliance/adversary model) has 
been consistently associated with changes in West European 
security perceptions and U.S. and Soviet reactions to those 
changes. Changes in these relationships have been largely 
responsible for determining the political environment in 
which the fate of US/Soviet arms control has been played 
out. It is likely they will do so in the future. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study points up several policy considerations 
necessary in understanding current arms control 
negotiations. 
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First, policymakers must consider the idea that 
subsystem influence on arms control may remain constant 
while domestic political factors in U.S. and Soviet foreign 
policymaking may vary. As long as the behavior of each 
actor toward the other remains consistent with their role as 
alliance partner and/or adversary, changes in U.S. and 
Soviet domestic political factors, such as the Political 
Leader Characteristics Variable used in this study, cannot 
entirely determine the fate of US/Soviet arms control. 
Policymakers must not only recognize the existence of 
subsystem influence (i.e., West European concerns of 
abandonment or entrapment), they must also consider the 
political implications of attempting to control that 
influence. This may be done either by continuing to manage 
the existing subsystem relationships, or by changing or 
eliminating the central features of those relationships--
those of military alliance partners and adversaries. 
As evidenced in this study, the management of alliance 
relations has often hindered US/Soviet arms control by 
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creating new security concerns. United States reaction to 
West European entrapment or abandonment concerns has 
generally created further changes in West European security 
perceptions, and subsequently, renewed U.S. reaction. 
Such a "circular" pattern of relations does not seem 
conducive to creating a more consistent positive environment 
for arms control. The right questions regarding more 
favorable and stable conditions for arms control, therefore, 
may well be ones which take to issue the nature of alliance 
relations, including the dissolution of NAT0. 1 As Sharp has 
argued, simply adjusting defense policies as part of 
alliance management will likely lead to West European 
perceptions of abandonment or entrapment, or both, "thereby 
becoming part of the problem rather than the solution." 2 
This dilemma of alliance management is also evidenced 
in more recent arms control negotiations. The Reykjavik 
summit meeting in October 1986, produced great concerns of 
abandonment in Western Europe as Reagan and Gorbachev spoke 
of eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe. 3 The signing 
of the INF Treaty in December 1987 raised questions 
regarding both entrapment (greater risk of conventional war 
in Europe), and abandonment (a move toward European 
denuclearization and American disengagement) . 4 Indeed, the 
dilemma involving INF and alliance cohesion was responded to 
with calls for modernizing conventional weapons in Europe,~ 
conventional and short-range nuclear weapons negotiations, 
143 
and calls for Western Europe to take greater responsibility 
for its defense.6 
A second consideration for present arms control 
policymaking concerns keeping Soviet foreign policy in 
historical perspective. Similar to Brezhnev's detente 
policy in SALT I, the success of Gorbachev's domestic 
policies of perestroika and glasnost are linked to East/West 
cooperation and a policy of dividing NATO politically rather 
than militarily. A trend toward an atmosphere of neo-
detente, coupled with a "tendency in the West to equate arms 
control with peace," 7 helps strengthen Gorbachev's domestic 
position as well as relaxing alliance purpose. U.S. 
policymakers must be cautious of Gorbachev's motives as well 
as sensitive to West European concerns. West European 
budgetary concerns and the problem for West European 
governments in maintaining fragile coalitions with 
opposition parties require Western Europe to adopt better 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
Grand proposals in arms control, such as Gorbachev's 
recent offers to unilaterally reduce the Soviet military by 
500,000 men and 10,000 tanks over the next two years, 8 and 
the removal of nuclear missiles and other arms under the 
control of 50,000 troops to be pulled out of Eastern 
Europe,9 must be viewed suspiciously as renewed efforts 
toward the political intimidation of Western Europe. Once 
again, alliance relations may be tested as the United States 
faces the issues of allowing closer West European/Soviet 
ties, negotiating further arms control, and shoring up 
alliance cohesion with arms modernization. 
FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS 
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This year marks a new chapter in arms control. INF is 
behind us now, and the success of START and the Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) negotiations will be 
influenced by the same variables that have affected past 
arms control negotiations. The Bush administration is faced 
with problems at home such as drugs, crime, the homeless, 
and the national debt. The theme of bipartisanship will be 
a key factor in determining policy goals and priorities.to 
Arms control will play a central role in this domestic 
political atmosphere as the realities of "executive-
congressional engagement" are played out. 
Gorbachev will likely deal with Bush from a stronger 
domestic position, though he may come under greater internal 
pressure to show positive results from his reforms. Unlike 
Brezhnev, however, Gorbachev's reforms have been radical and 
far reaching, and their effects may take several years to 
filter through the system. The Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and proposals to cut back the military, 
combined with the effects of internal restructuring and a 
more open society, will surely test Soviet power at home and 
abroad. If Soviet reforms are the reaction to the USSR in 
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decline, 11 then Gorbachev may likely continue the current 
trend in policies. The West must be aware, however, that 
based on past actions, Soviet policies of cooperation can be 
deceiving. 
Another consideration for arms control policymaking is 
that Western Europe will likely continue to become a more 
influential political and economic power. Further steps 
will likely be made toward West European integration. 12 
Western Europe will have greater influence on questions 
regarding its own security. US/Soviet arms control 
negotiations involving conventional weapons in Europe will 
involve a more direct decisionmaking responsibility for West 
European governments. The military capabilities of European 
NATO nations will not be as easily ignored as they were in 
SALT and INF. 
If the central features of the subsystem relationships 
are left unchanged, what we may likely see is a continuation 
of the cyclical pattern of relations that has governed arms 
control thus far. If this is the case, then we are entering 
a positive environment for arms control. Western Europe and 
the Soviet Union need closer ties with one another for 
political as well as economical reasons. Closer West 
European/Soviet relations will rely on continued US/Soviet 
cooperation. 
If, however, the central features of the subsystem 
relationships are changed, due to either the dissolution of 
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NATO as we now know it, or the end of the US/Soviet 
adversarial relationship, the 40th anniversary of NATO may 
mark the end of an era, and the beginning of a totally new 
arms control environment. 
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tThis policy implication has recently been touched 
upon, although not specifically as a response to the issue 
of subsystem influence on arms control. Several examples of 
pro-alliance management can be found. See, for example, 
Michael R. Gordon, "INF: A Hollow Victory?" Foreign Policy 
(No. 68, Fall 1987), and; Jonathan Dean, "Military Security 
in Europe," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. l, Fall 1987). 
For a pro-disengagement argument, see, for example, 
Christopher Layne, ''Atlanticism without NATO," Foreign 
Policy (No. 67, Summer 1987). 
2 Jane M.O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance 
Commitments," Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 100, No. 4, 
Winter 1985-86), p. 652. 
3 Two noteworthy discussions of the Reykjavik summit 
include, Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, "Reykjavik 
and Beyond," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 2, Winter 1986-
87), and; James Schlesinger, "Reykjavik and Revelations: A 
Turn of the Tide?" Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 3, 1986). 
4 For a detailed discussion of West European reaction 
to INF, see, for example, Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF 
Treaty," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 4, Spring 1988). 
~see, for example, Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, 
Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, 
No. 4, Spring 1988), and, more recently; Melissa Healy, 
"NATO Chief Offers Modernization Plan," The Oregonian 
(August 11, 1988), p. All. 
6 Bryan Brumley, "U.S. prods NATO allies to do more," 
The Oregonian (December 29, 1988), p. A9. 
'Dimitri K. Simes, "Gorbachev: A Mew Foreign Policy?'' 
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 3, 1986), p. 492. 
BBill Keller, "Soviet tells U.N. he will make 
'unilateral' troop reductions," The Oregonian (December 8, 
1988), pp. Al, Al4. 
9Carol J. Williams, "When Soviet troops leave, so will 
their nuclear arms," The Oregonian (January 20, 1989), p. 
AS. 
1°The theme of bipartisanship was part of George 
Bush's inaugural speech. "And we need a new engagement, 
too, between the executive and the Congress ... A new 
breeze is blowing--and the old bipartisanship must be made 
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new again." Excerpts are from transcripts re-printed in The 
Oregonian (January 21, 1989), p. A15. 
The theme was also promoted in Henry Kissinger and 
Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988). 
11 Robert G. Kaiser, "The U.S.S.R. in Decline," Foreign 
Affairs (Vol. 67, No. 2, Winter 1988-89), p. 97. 
1 2such efforts may include progress in the development 
of an Anglo-French nuclear weapons system, formation of a 
Franco-German military brigade; or have included, the 
revival of the Western European Union (WEU), and the 
formation of the Franco-German Council on Defense and 
Security. 
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TABLE I 
SALT I SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1969-MAY i972 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 148 
neutral 99 
negative 71 
US/W. Europe 
positive 52 
neutral 52 
negative 20 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 89 
neutral 20 
negative 32 
Total Observations ill 
162 
Percent 
47 
31 
22 
42 
42 
16 
63 
14 
23 
TABLE II 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1969 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 35 
neutral 33 
negative 17 
US/W. Europe 
24 positive 
neutral 22 
negative 10 
.IJ. Europe/USSR 
positive 29 
neutral 8 
negative 11 
Total Observations 182 
163 
Percent 
41 
39 
20 
4J 
39 
18 
60 
17 
23 
TABLE III 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1970 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 21 
neutral 17 
negative 28 
US/~v. Europe 
positive 4 
neutral 9 
negative 4 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 15 
neutral 4 
negative 2 
Total Observations 104 
164 
Percent 
32 
26 
42 
23.5 
53 
23.5 
71 
19 
10 
TABLE IV 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1971 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 58 
neutral 27 
negative 1) 
US///. Europe 
positive 15 
neutral 8 
negative 4 
:/J. Europe/USSR 
positive 28 
neutral 2 
negative 14 
Total Observations 169 
165 
Percent 
59 
28 
1) 
55 
JO 
15 
64 
4 
)2 
TABLE V 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
ll'HRU MAY 1972 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
34 positive 
neutral 22 
negative 13 
us/w. Europe 
positive 9 
neutral 1J 
negative 2 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 17 
neutral 6 
negative 5 
Total Observations 121 
166 
Percent 
49 
32 
19 
38 
54 
8 
61 
21 
18 
TABLE VI 
SALT II SUBSYSTEM DATA 
197)-1979 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 229 
neutral 185 
negative 146 
US/W. Europe 
positive 133 
neutral 138 
negative 69 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 94 
neutral 50 
negative 57 
Total Observations 1101 
167 
Percent 
41 
33 
26 
39 
41 
20 
47 
25 
28 
TABLE VII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1973 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 47 
neutral 37 
negative 16 
US/W. Europe 
positive 19 
neutral 27 
negative 17 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 30 
neutral 7 
negative 9 
Total Observations 202 
168 
Percent 
47 
37 
16 
JO 
43 
27 
65 
15 
20 
TABLE VIII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1974 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 73 
neutral 43 
negative 20 
US/W. Europe 
positive 21 
neutral 21 
negative 8 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 19 
neutral 5 
negative 7 
Total Observations 21z 
169 
Percent 
53.5 
31.5 
15 
42 
42 
16 
61 
16 
23 
TABLE IX 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1975 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 26 
neutral 22 
negative 15 
us/w. Europe 
positive 20 
neutral 23 
negative 16 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 15 
neutral 9 
negative 5 
Total Observations 151 
170 
Percent 
41 
35 
24 
34 
39 
27 
52 
31 
17 
TABLE X 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1976 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 17 
neutral 22 
negative 15 
US/W. Europe 
positive 14 
neutral 14 
negative 5 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 5 
neutral 6 
negative 7 
Total Observations 105 
171 
Percent 
31 
41 
28 
42.5 
42.5 
15 
28 
33 
39 
TABLE XI 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1977 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 31 
neutral 31 
negative 31 
us/w. Europe 
positive 20 
neutral 19 
negative 10 
w. Europe/USSR 
positive 10 
neutral 8 
negative 10 
Total Observations 170 
172 
Percent 
33.3 
33.3 
33.3 
41 
39 
20 
35.5 
29 
35.5 
TABLE XII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1978 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 20 
neutral 16 
negative 32 
US/W. Europe 
positive 24 
neutral 20 
negative 8 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 8 
neutral 9 
negative 8 
Total Observations 145 
173 
Percent 
29 
24 
47 
46 
39 
15 
32 
36 
32 
TABLE XIII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1979 
Variable ·observations 
US/USSR 
positive 15 
neutral 14 
negative 17 
US/w. Europe 
positive 15 
neutral 14 
negative 5 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 7 
neutral 6 
negative 11 
Total Observations 104 
174 
Percent 
33 
30 
37 
44 
41 
15 
29 
25 
46 
TABLE XIV 
INF/START SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1980-1983 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 55 
neutral 94 
negative 151 
US/w. Europe 
positive 66 
neutral 92 
negative 47 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 24 
neutral 45 
negative 54 
Total Observations /::.')R 628 
175 
Percent 
18.3 
31.3 
50.3 
32 
45 
23 
19.5 
36.5 
44 
TABLE XV 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1980 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 8 
neutral 24 
negative 40 
US/W. Europe 
positive 20 
neutral 21 
negative 12 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 6 
neutral 15 
negative 8 
Total Observatlons 1 t:.IL 124 
176 
Percent 
11 
33 
56 
38 
40 
22 
21 
52 
27 
TABLE XVI 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1981 
. 
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 14 
neutral 23 
negative 37 
US/W. Europe 
positive 15 
neutral 23 
negative 14 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 4 
neutral 7 
negative 12 
Total Observations 142 
177 
Percent 
19 
31 
50 
29 
44 
27 
17.5 
J0.5 
52 
TABLE XVII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1982 
-
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 17 
neutral 18 
negative 26 
US/W. Europe 
positive 16 
neutral 28 
negative 7 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 4 
neutral 6 
negative 15 
Total Observations lJZ 
178 
Percent 
28 
29.5 
42 . .5 
31 
.5.5 
14 
16 
24 
60 
TABLE XVIII 
SUBSYSTEM DATA 
1983 
-
Variable Observations 
US/USSR 
positive 16 
neutral 29 
negative 48 
us/w. Europe 
positive 15 
neutral 20 
negative 14 
W. Europe/USSR 
positive 10 
neutral 17 
negative 19 
Total Observations 188 
179 
Percent 
17 
31 
52 
30.5 
41 
28.5 
22 
37 
41 
